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INTRODUCTION

The proceedings of the conference, PERSPECTIVES ON RISK: A
CLEMSON UNIVERSITY SYMPOSIUM, consists of eight papers presented
at the symposium. The papers are divided into three topical sections
as follows: (1) Biological and Medical Perspectives, (2) Historical and
Philosophical Perspectives, and (3) Social Science Pe r spectives .
The paper by Dr. Jere Brittain, "Pesticides: Paradox and Dilemma
in the Land of Plenty," introduces issues facing agriculture today related
to the use of pesticides and other chemicals and their consequences.
Dr . Ron Dillon ' s paper · focuses on biological risks and the need for pre
cision in definitions and research methodologies. In his paper,
"Epidemiologic Aspects of Risk Assessment Emphasizing Birth Defects,"
Dr . Stanley Schuman, a physician on the staff of the Medical University
of South Carolina, takes an applied medical perspective of human health
risks and long-term consequences of current agricultural use of chemicals
and subsequent health hazards.
In Section 11, Dr . William Stei rer uses an historical and chronological
approach to assess the changing technology associated with environmental
risks . The paper, "Risk Methodology and the Pesticide Dilemma," by
Dr. Kristin Shrader-Frechette addresses a number of philosophical con
cerns. She notes that this emerging issue-area needs interdisciplinary
contributions. She calls for greater precision in definitions and improved
conceptualization and research methodologies for risk assessment. The
paper by Dr . Laura Westra , also a philosopher, is primarily an evaluation
and an extension of the position taken by Shrader-Frechette.
The third and final section of the proceedings contains psychological
and sociological perspectives of risk assessment. Dr. Jeffrey Burroughs
uses non-agricultural examples to illustrate how indiv iduals' behavior is
influenced by the perception of actual or potential risk in the environ
ment . Dr. Brenda Vander Mey, a sociologist, combines the contributions
of demographers, ecologists, historians, economists, and sociologists into
one essay. The premise of her paper outlines the growing need for
interdisciplinary cooperation and investigation in this field.

SECTION I
BIOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL PERSPECTIVES

PESTICIDES:

PARADOX AND DILEMMA IN THE LAND OF PLENTY 1
Jere A . Brittain, Ph.D . 2
Professor of Horticulture
Department of Horticulture
Clemson University

"Watermelons Contaminated by Pesticides in California ."
" Apple
Industry Threatened by Loss of Chemical." "Nation's Most Widely Used
Corn and Soybean Herbicide Under Special Review." These media head 
lines confronted the public in 1985.
Farmers and consumers are confused and frustrated by a seemingly
endless stream of questions and challenges about the safety of food,
water, and air. Are farmers responsible stewards of the land, food, and
water? Are consumers and the public agencies charged with their pro 
tection setting reasonable standards for farmers whose not-so-silent
partner is a fickle and unpredictable Mother Nature? What and whom
should one believe about pesticides and health? What is the role of the
landgrant university in all of this? The professors at the agricultural
colleges all receive grants from the pesticide companies, don't they?
Clemson University, as most landgrant schools, is involved heav ily
in research and educational programs in pest management, includ ing
pesticides . Unlike most landgrant universities, Clemson is also charged
with enforcing the South Carolina Pesticide Control Act of 1975. through
its Division of Regulatory and Public Service Programs, Responsibilities
under this act include issuance of more than 6,000 pesticide labels per
year and licensing farmers and others to purchase and use certain re
stricted pesticides .
Concerns have been expressed about potential conflicts of interest
arising from the University ' s research and extension connections with
farmers and the pesticide industry. Spokesmen for Clemson's Division
of Regulatory and Public Service Programs contend that the educational
environment of the university is more conducive to enlightened pesticide
regulation than the more common state regulatory agency environment .
South Carolina farmers currently use approximately 10 million pounds
per year (active ingredient basis) of organic pesticides on five major
crops . Pesticide use levels in South Carolina have declined since 1975 .
This is a combined result of new chemicals that are effective at lower
1

Adapted from a paper, "The Role of the Landgrant University in Pesti
cide Education, Research and Regulation," presented at Winthrop College,
1985 .
2

Coordinator, Integrated Pest Management Program and Agromedicine
Program, Clemson University.
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rates and a trend toward prescriptive, rather than preventive, use of
pesticides.
Prescriptive use of pesticides has been stimulated by a combination
of economic pressures (controlling production costs) and promotion of
integrated pest management ( I PM) practices by state Cooperative Exten
sion Services. IPM involves combining cultural, biological, and chemical
pest control tactics based on maximum knowledge of the crop-pest
ecosystem, with sensitivity to environmental impacts.
Many producers
of cotton, soybeans, tomatoes, peaches, and tobacco routinely hire
trained observers to systematically "scout" their crops for insects, dis
eases, and weeds. Pest levels are reported to growers who compare the
levels to research-based economic damage th res holds.
Parasites and
predators of insect pests are also reported and considered before pre
scribing a pesticide application.
Long-term crop and pest histories are
recorded for individual fields to aid in predicting future problems.
Some faculty at landgrant universities are involved in pesticide re
search; some research is supported by industry grants.
Many more
members of landgrant faculties are involved with cultural and biological
aspects of pest management. These include biology of the pest, physi
ology of the host-pest relationship, breeding for pest resistance,
epidemiology, predators, cropping systems (rotation), pest-crop model
ing, and pest forecasting.
The politically active environmental movement of the late '60s and
the decade of the '70s led to significant federal funding of integrated
pest management research and Extension programs. With the decline in
federal funding for these programs in the '80s, a few states (California
and New York) have provided state support for IPM.
At this writing,
South Carolina has not provided earmarked state funding for IPM pro
grams.
The General Assembly of South Carolina has recognized the pesticide
and human health issue by funding an Agromedicine Center involving the
Medical University of South Carolina and Clemson University. This center
makes available medical consultation and collaboration to agricultural re
search, Extension, and teaching programs as well as to agribusiness.
An important aspect of the role of the landgrant university in pest
management education is the absence of "crop doctoring" training
analagous to that of veterinarians and medical doctors.
Farmers must
diagnose their own crop problems and prescribe their own treatments.
They obtain somewhat fragmented advice from a combination of county
Extension agents, pesticide industry representatives, and neighboring
farmers. A few farmers receive systematic pest management advice from
independent crop consultants with varying levels of training and expe
rience.
Clemson University has proposed to the State Commission on Higher
Education a new graduate training program in Plant Health. This program
would provide holistic, interdiscipli nary, professional (non-research)
4

training for students interested in crop-doctoring careers in public
agencies or industry . Requirements for attaining the degree would in
clude a comprehensive, boards-type exit examination designed to certify
competency to diagnose and prescribe remedies for problems of specific
crops . Currently, most graduate students in agricultural sciences re 
ceive training designed for research rather than practitioner careers .
Faculty (Extension and research) at landgrant universities are fre
quently requested to comment on the benefits side during risk/benefit
analysis of contested pesticide registrations .
In responding to these
requests, they are faced with a serious dilemma .
Should one support
the continued use of a product with known carcinogenic properties? Is
it "good science" to extrapolate from responses of sensitive small animal
strains to large dosages of a chemical to an estimated risk for humans
during lifetimes of exposure to small dosages? How does this theoretical
increase in risk relate to other unavoidable risk exposures such as to
naturally occurring carcinogens in food products and ultraviolet radi
ation? Here is the pesticide paradox. If human beings are part of na 
ture, should their chemical inventions necessarily be considered intrusive
and unnatural?
Acute toxicology of pesticides can be dealt with in a relatively
straightforward manner.
Low-level chronic toxicology raises issues in
the fuzzy zone where biological science and technology meet the humani
ties and social sciences .
Historians, philosophers, sociologists, and
psychologists are becoming increasingly interested and involved in tech
nology assessment and risk/benefit analysis. Agricultural and biological
scientists should welcome this involvement.
Faculties at landgrant uni
versities may find in technology assessment a unique catalyst for working
across disciplinary lines on fuzzy-zone problems important to both farmers
and consumers.

5

RISK ASSESSMENT FROM A BIOLOGIST'S PERSPECTIVE
C. Ron Dillon, Ph.D.
Professor of Botany
Department of Biological Sciences
Clemson University

In developing this paper on risk assessment, I listed five questions
to which I wanted answers. From the perspective of a research biologist
who has been involved only peripherally with this subject, they are:
What
What
What
What
What

is risk assessment?
information is needed to make a risk assessment?
biological methods are available to assess risks?
mathematical methods substantiate the biological findings?
are the analytical results and how reliable are they?

Risk assessment in the world today focuses primarily on cancer and
carcinogens in humans. Assessment is a complicated and actually
ascientific or quasi-scientific process in many aspects, as many questions
need to be answered that cannot be experimentally tested, proved, or
disproved.
Park and Snee 1 have broken out risk assessment as the
groundwork for risk management.
Of the four steps involved in as
sessment and management, assessment is subdivided into three parts:
Haza rd identification, hazard evaluation, and risk evaluation.
To evaluate hazards and estimate assorted risks--and here we mean
humans--analyses of the following types of studies must be made:
Mutagen icity
Acute studies in animals
Subchronic studies in animals
Metabolism in animals and humans
Chronic studies in animals
Epidemiology
Route and amount of exposure.
Boiling these seven topics down amounts to saying that we have two
ways to assess risk to human health from exposure to toxic agents, the
first being epidemiological or clinical studies of human populations and
the second experimental tests on animals or other biological systems.
Of these, epidemiological studies are often incomplete.
It is difficult to
measure accurately individual exposure patterns, and the control of fac
tors may modify or confound quantitative measures of health risk.
Moreover, delays between exposure and occurrence of a measurable effect
can range up to decades.
Plus of course, for new carcinogens, there
are no human data.

6

Is it then possible to learn about risks to human health by feeding
huge quantities of diet soft drink to laboratory animals? The answer is
a somewhat qualified and timorous "yes" or perhaps only "maybe" , if valid
statistical method is used to extrapolate the data to levels of human in 
take .
If one is to extrapolate tests from animals to humans, much care
must be taken in design and conduct of the studies .
Factors that in 
fluence the results include dosage and frequency of exposure, route of
administration, species , strain, sex, and age of the animal, and duration
of the study .
Experimental data must be based on exposure levels higher than
those for which human risk estimation is to be made, because at very low
dose levels extremely large numbers of animals must be used to reduce
statistical error.
(The largest number of animals I've found was in a
study conducted by National Center for Toxicological Research that used
24 , 000 mice over 24 months to determine the dose-response of
2-acetylaminofluorine . Most studies use 100 animals or fewer). Measur
able effects must come for exposure levels high enough to provide positive
results; then, because human populations are more often exposed to low
levels, data must be extrapolated to lower exposure levels.
Statistical Methods for High-Dose - Low - Dose Extrapolation
Although extrapolation
known from the observed,
methods that may be used
of those, listed in order of
dose, are as follows:

is often used in science to arrive at an un
there has developed a family of statistical
for high-dose - low-dose extrapolation. Six
their ability to estimate potential risk at low

Model

Estimate of Potential Risk

One-hit
Multi-stage
Weibull
Multi-hit
Log logistic or logit
Probit or log normal

Highest

Lowest

I make no claim to being a statistician or mathematician; however,
like most in biological sciences, I do use cookbook statistical programs
to show "goodness of fit" or statistical reliability and so on. From that
standpoint, it has been interesting to try to understand the difference
in these models for use in estimating risk and to try to understand why
one of them will not suffice. For most of the information that follows, I
have drawn heavily and freely on the work of Park and Snee 2 and
Brown. 3
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The One-Hit Model
The one-hit model assumes that for any given age, the probability
of a tumor is directly proportional to the amount of exposure. This can
result from the assumption that only one critical molecular event between
a target site and the proximate carcinogen is sufficient to result in a
tumor, and the probability of such an interaction is directly proportional
to the nominal concentration of the carcinogen.
The model assumes a dose-response
low doses. As commonly used, the model
of nonlinear dose-response mechanisms,
levels or th res holds of a real or practical

that is approximately linear at
ignores the toxicological reality
saturation kinetics, no-effect
nature .

The model does estimate an upper limit on the potential risk and
may be useful in situations where an upper bound is of interest.
For
example, if the potential risk calculated by the one-hit model is not un
acceptable, then there wou Id be less need to consider other models. On
the other hand, if permissible exposures predicted by the one-hit model
are unrealistically low, which is often the case, then further risk analyses
would have to be made to confirm or refute the one-hit model results.
In all cases it must be kept in mind that potential risks predicted by the
one-hit model may be several orders of magnitude more than the true
potential risk.
The Multi-Stage Model
Biological justification for this model is that cancer is believed to
be a multi-stage process that can be approximated by a series of multi
plicative linear functions.
For instance, the concentration of the
proximate carcinogen at the target site can be modeled by a series of
kinetic reactions that are usually assumed to be linear at low doses but
may be non-linear at high doses.
Concentration kinetics may also be
linear at low doses. No proportional response is implied because at some
concentration the existence of defense and repair systems is likely to
modulate the response.
Generally, this model fits well in the observable or experimental dose
range, but it has very limited applicability to the estimation of potential
risk at low doses.
Limitations arise, first, because the model cannot
reflect low dose changes in kinetics, metabolism, and mechanisms and,
second, because low-dose estimates are highly sensitive to a change of
even a few observed tumors at the lowest experimental dose.
The statistical approach to account for the random variation in tumor
frequencies is to express the results in terms of measures of uncertainty.
There is then a "Linearized Multi-Stage Model," the math and statistical
manipulations of which I won't try to cover, but will only say that the
dose response predicted by this model results in estimates of potential
risk that are almost identical to those of the one-hit model; and for almost
8

all applications there is no appreciable difference between the linear model
and the linearized multi-stage model.
Multi-Hit Model
The "hit theory" for interaction between radiation particles and
susceptible biologic targets has generated a general class of models which
includes the "One-Hit Model" already discussed and the "Multi-Hit Model."
The theory rests on several postulates, such as the following:
An organism has a certain number of "critical targets."
The organism responds when some of these targets are destroyed .
The target is destroyed if hit by so many toxic particles.
The probability of a hit is proportional to the dose level.
The multi-hit model assumes that some specific or approximate
number of molecular interactions are necessary to induce the formation
of a tumor, and the distribution of these molecular events over time is
randomly distributed or follows a Poisson series. The model appears to
fit some data fairly well and to give low-dose predictions that are similar
to other models. However, there are other cases where predicted values
may vary from other models by several orders of magnitude, and where
VIRTUALLY SAFE DOSE may be, obviously, either too high or too low.
All of the foregoing are models derived from "mechanistic" assump
tions; this means that something must affect something, and all tend to
provide a linear dose-response curve. Essentially the implication is that
the greater the dose the greater the response, or the greater the pro
portion of responses to be expected and vice versa. As stated above,
they also tend to provide the higher estimates of potential risk.
The last three models in the list are tolerance distribution models.
Under constant environmental conditions, one commonly assumes that
there is a certain dose level below which the particular subject will not
respond in a specified manner and above which the subject will respond
with certainty.
This level is referred to as the subject's tolerance.
Because individuals within a population lack genetic homogeneity, their
tolerance levels vary. These models consider the frequency distribution
of cumulative tolerances over the population, and the sigmoid curves
resulting from plotting proportion responding to dose level can be thought
of as representing the dose response either for the population as a whole
or for a randomly selected individual.
The Probit or Log Normal Model
This model was originally proposed for use in problems in biological
assay, i.e., the assessment of the potency of toxicants, drugs, and other
biological stimuli, and has been primarily used for problems of dose
response interpolation (estimation within the range of observable response
rates) rather than dose-response extrapolation (estimation outside the
9

range of observable rates). The model has been modified 4 for extrapo
lation of expected low-dose response from experimentally induced effects
observed at high dose. The modification made was to arbitrarily establish
a conservatively shallower slope than that predicted from the plot of the
experimental study. The arbitrary slope is not meant to represent the
"true" slope in the low-dose region, but rather a conservatively shallow
slope no matter what the true dose response may be in this region. The
modified model does not provide a necessarily valid estimate of low-dose
risk, but rather provides a conservative estimate of risk.
The Log-Logistical Model or Logit
This model, which was derived from chemical kinetic theory, is
similar to probit in that the projected cumulative response curve is
sigmoid and symmetrical around the 50 percent response level, but ap
proaches the 0- and 100-percent response levels more slowly than does
probit. It is said that probit and logit functions are so similar in ap
pearance that discrimination between them is nearly impossible.
The Weibull Model
This model is based on a 1951 theory by Fisher and Holloman 5 that
carcinogenesis is a multi-cell rather than a single-cell phenomenon. As
such, this model has many of the dose- response extrapolation character
istics of the multi-hit model.
There are other models that we could discuss. Among them are the
pharmacokinetic models, which are often based on Michaelis-Mento'n ex
pressions, and which assume that biological effects are manifestations of
biochemical interactions between foreign substances and components of
the body. Actual mechanisms of toxicity are many and varied, and the
kinetics that relate the concentration and exposure duration of a toxic
substance, with its effect at its site of action, depends upon the type
of mechanism or mode of action of the toxin.
At this point you might begin to wonder at the number of models
that may be used in risk assessment and how to pick the proper one for
some application. Bear in mind that all of these, at least the mechanistic
and the dose-tolerance models, tend to provide generally agreeable re
sults when compared over the range of observable response rates. Note
the following:
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TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF DOSE-RESPONSE RELATIONSHIPS OVER
A RANGE OF OBSERVABLE RESPONSE RATES
Percent Responders
Dose

level

84
69
50
31
16

4
2
1
.5
. 25

1- hit

Legit

Log normal
84
70
50
30
16

Multi - hit
99
85
50

94
75
50
29
16

21
7

Weibull Multi - stage
99
85
49
21
8

100
85
46
21
9

The differences seen here are often not statistically significant o
However , compare the next table:
TABLE 2
EXTRAPOLATION OF DOSE - RESPONSE RELATIONSHIPS TO LOW
DOSE LEVELS

Percent Responders
Dose level
. 01
. 001
. 0001

Log normal
.005
. 00035
1 X 10- 7

Logit

.4
.026
. 0016

1- hit
.7
.07
.007

Multi-hit
.014
.00014
1.5x10- 5

Weibull

Multi-stage

. 067
.3
. 0021
. 03
6 . 7x10-5 . 003

Note that the models are indeed similar to each other in the range
of observable response rates, yet differ in the region of primary interest ,
the lower , unobservable response rates.
Charles Brown 6 states : "This
is the single most important limitation of extrapolation methodology . An
estimate of risk at a particular low dose, or an estimate of the dose
leading to a prespecific level of risk, is highly dependent upon the
mathematical form of the presumed dose-response; differences of 3 - 4 or
ders of magnitude are not uncommon.
The proposal of "new" models,
unless based upon strong mechanistic information, will not alleviate the
difficulties . .. . The contribution from statist icians and model-builders has
reached an impasse, and more accurate extrapolations are not possible
without additional information on the mechanisms of action of the toxic
agents . "
11
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Further, from Park and Snee, "Extrapolations of tumorigenic re
sponses to very low doses by means of mathematical models are of limited
value because the models can have no validated biological basis since
these are not known for any carcinogen. Certainly, any extrapolations
should be made with great care and only in conjunction with a variety
of supporting data. To do otherwise amounts to nothing more than a
blind curve fitting exercise with little predictive value.... It is unlikely
that the regulatory decision process will be even largely quantified by a
single model, or group of models, in the near future. " 7
The question then arises as to how you decide which model to use
when trying to predict low-dose response.
I do not have a definitive
answer and at present apparently none exists. The only answer seems
to be use them all, and then make an arbitrary decision (read that "ed
ucated guess") as to which should govern based on available knowledge.
That necessity plus the requirement that other questions must be ad
dressed (see those appended), none of which can be answered with an
ything approaching scientific certainty, prompted my earlier remark that
much of risk assessment is indeed ascientific.
This presentation wou Id seem to have deviated from the topic of
"Biological Aspects of Risk Assessment;" but in fact the statistical in
terpretation of biological data is an integral part of biological research,
and the two will always be intertwined.
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Appendix
QUESTIONS THAT AN ASSESSOR CONCERNED WITH A CARCINOGEN
MUST EXAMINE, BUT WHICH CANNOT BE ANSWERED WITH SCIENTIFIC
CERTAINTY 6
Is finding excess tumor production in experimental animals sufficient to
conclude that a substance will display carcinogenic properties in humans?
12

Which of several different sets of experimental animal data is most ap
propriate for estimating human risk?
Which sets of tumor data should be used for high to low dose extrapo
lation?
Which mathematical models of the dose-response curve should be used to
estimate low-dose risk?
Which measure of dose should be used for interspecies extrapolation?
How should differences in frequency, timing, and duration of exposure
be taken into account when extrapolating experimental observations to
human populations?
How should magnitude, frequency, and duration of human exposure be
estimated if only limited data are available (as is usually the case)?
How should various exposed populations be stratified for purposes of
assigning risks?
How shou Id final risk estimates be expressed?
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THE "MIRAGE OF HEALTH":
EPIDEMIOLOGIC ASPECTS OF RISK ASSESSMENT
EMPHASIZING BIRTH DEFECTS
Stanley H. Schuman, M.D., Dr.P.H.
Medical Di rector
Agromedicine Program
Clemson University and the
Medical University of South Carolina

Concern for human health has lead to increasing efforts to assess
the evidence for and against causation by pesticides.
The sciences
contributing to the evidence are:
analytical chemistry, environmental
studies, experimental toxicology in vivo and in vitro, clinical poisonings,
biostatistics, and epidemiology.
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF PRESUMED HEAL TH EFFECTS
Epidemiology (as the basic science of preventive medicine) tries to
assess the short-term and long-term health effects in human populations
of exposure to a suspect risk factor (toxin, occupation, diet, etc.).
Despite over 40 years of experience with several generations of pesti
cides, little evidence for toxic effects beyond acute clinical poisoning can
be linked to pesticides (Table 1). Listed in Table 2 are seven categories
of possible health effects. Category (A) reflects acute clinical poisonings
that occur under conditions of accidental exposure to high concentrations
of a pesticide or mix tu res of pesticides.
These incidents lead to re
strictions on use, warning labels, and strict handling practices in man
ufacture and agriculture. The other health effects (B - F) are legitimate
concerns for any suspect exposure to any of the chemical classes of
pesticides, but relatively little is known.
In order to detect a linkage
between one type of rare cancer and one type of pesticide exposure, a
recent study required 333 cancer cases and 1000 control subjects. Over
three years of meticulous interviews and data analysis were required to
discover this important but limited relationship (11% excess risk).
Extrapolation
Unfortunately, delayed or indirect health effects based on smaller
doses over an extended period of time, are now being estimated by ex
trapolation from partial data or animal models. 1 Extrapolation of human
health effects from data on high doses over short-time periods given to
small animals requires attention to detail, experimental judgment, and
mathematical models of lifetime exposure th rough ingestion of food and
water, inhalation of air, or skin contact and exposure.
Scientists are
being asked to extend their judgment beyond the data to arrive at the
"most prudent" recommendation, a "ball-park figure," or an estimate of
"potential for harm" for the regulatory agencies.
In fact, these ex
trapolations have led to the use of the terms "the new toxicology" and
"regulatory science" by Efron. 2
The limits of experimental toxicology
14

(what is the most appropriate test species or strain of animal?) and the
mathematical models (thresholds for dose-response curves) place special
weight on the findings from human studies involv ing epidemiology.

TABLE 1
TRENDS IN INSECTICIDES
-

Arsenicals (Paris Green)
Organochlorines · (DDT)
Organophosphates (Parathion)
Carbamates (Carbary!)
Bacterial (Bacillus Thuringiensis)
Synthetic Pyrethroid (Permethrin); Hormone ( ProDrone)
Products
Research
=
New

TABLE 2
SO-CALLED HEALTH EFFECTS OF PESTICIDES
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

Acute (Intoxication)
Subacute ( Delayed)
Chronic (Cancer)
Reproductive (Fertility, Birth Defects)
Allergy (Hypersensitivity)
Psychological
( Condit ioned

Response)

The Natural History of Birth Defects
For purposes of this interdisciplinary symposium, I would like to
select birth defects as an example of epidemiology contributing important
new information on the possible teratogenic effects of pesticides.
Successful birthing begins with a healthy ovum and healthy sperm
and ends with uncomplicated delivery.
The first 2 to 8 weeks of fetal
deve lopment is especially susceptible to damage. Birth defects are man
ifest in at least 161 clinical categories, singly and in combination,ranging
from minor malformations to major Iife-th reatening defects. Overall, two
to three percent of infants (live and stillborn) have one or more defects.
Dr . J. Warkany reminds us that nature eliminates abnormal ova and
embryos (spontaneous abortion). 3
Otherwise "the frequency of birth
defects would be 12 percent instead of 2 to 3."
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"Even today only about 10 percent of human malformations can be
ascribed to environmental factors. " 4
(These factors include viruses,
parasites, drug therapy for cancer, epilepsy and diabetes, bacteria,
irradiation, and exposure of mother and father to chemicals). An addi
tional 25 percent of malformations can be blamed on genetic or ch romo
somal mechanisms (including consanguinity).
The majority of birth
defects - 65 percent - are as yet unexplained as to causation.
The
science of human birth defects (teratology) has a long way to go.
Marionfeld reminds us that when it comes to birth defects,
veterinary medicine and human medicine are not too different . 5
In
Missouri during the 60's, he monitored human and swine birth defects
on a statewide basis. Defects of the central nervous system (brain and
spine) were the same proportion (14%) of all birth defects; the other
organ system defects were quite similar between 1.6 million human births
and 5 . 1 million swine births. Fortunately no new chemical hazards were
detected in the detailed Missouri studies of human and swine reprod
uction.
In another study, a cyclops (one-eye) deformity in lambs was
traced to toxic effects of the pregnant sheep grazing on veratrum
californicum, a naturally occuring toxin. 6
This background of naturally occurring birth defects occurs in ev
ery country regardless of latitude or longitude, urbanization, or indus
trialization.
It is difficult, but not impossible, to detect a new cause
or increase in specified human birth defects. The tools are clinical di
agnosis and standardized monitoring. A successful example was the early
recognition of phocomelia (limb-reduction deformity) resulting from
pregnant women taking thalidomide during 1959-1961. 7 Dramatic as this
epidemic was, the deformity itself was recognized sporadically in Europe
before the epidemic as well as in ancient times.
(See Figure 1 on next
page) 8 Contrary to popular belief, phocomelia deformity is not unique
to the man-made drug, thalidomide, but is the expression of some insult
to the fetus at a critical stage of development.
Epidemiologic Studies of Birth Defects
Currently the government is conducting several massive studies of
U.S. servicemen who experienced exposure to dioxin contaminants of the
herbicide, 2,4,5-T (Agent Orange) used as a defoliant in Viet Nam. So
far, the data do not show an increase in birth defects, stillbirths, or
sterility in exposed veterans compared to
(control)
nonexposed
veterans. 9 Nevertheless, in parallel to the veterans ' concern, there has
been a growing civilian concern over the past two decades of the growing
use of pesticides in general and herbicides in particular. 10 Over 50
percent of the pesticides used in S. C. last year were in the herbicide
category.
The suspension of Silvex by EPA was argued on the basis of a
cluster of miscarriages among several women in Alsea, Oregon, in 1980
and a followup epidemiologic study.
Unfortunately, the EPA study was
flawed both in design and interpretation. The findings were later dis
credited by international review by scientific peers. Thus, the birth
16

Figure 1
An example of limb reduction defect
(phocomelia) from a medical textbook
published in 1891. This predates any
of the epidemic of thalidomide induced
phocomelia birth defects seventy years
later (1961). 7 , 8
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defects of dioxins produced in animals were not confirmed in Oregon.
The discrepancy between potential and actual fetotoxicity was not de
tected until after the legal restrictive action was ta ken. Needless to say,
the Silvex ban remains in effect. 11
Another example is the study of delayed health effects of exposure
to the residents of the toxic waste dump site of Love Canal, New York .
Although subjective reports suggested an excess percentage of birth
defects, the only objective finding from the highest exposure area within
the Love Canal subdivision was a statistical reduction in birth weight.
This is of the same order found to be associated with smoking during
pregnancy. 12 Careful chromosome aberation studies in the blood of ex
posed cases and controls revealed no differences. 13
Occupational Exposure
What new information from epidemiologic monitoring of U.S. birth
defects is available to shed light on the potential or actual reproductive
harm resulting from sustained high use of agricultural herbicides? A
study of 314 agricultural aviation pilots and 150 controls (nonpilot male
siblings) was conducted to detect any reproductive health effects. Most
pilots had over 15 years of occupational exposure to concentrated doses
of pesticides. There was no evidence of reproductive damage. This was
reassuring to the participants. 14
Unfortunately, human reproduction
studies of occupational exposure have at least two limitations:
poor
quantitation of exposure and relatively small numbers of conceptions.
One hesitates to generalize from specialized agriculture pilots to the
general population at risk.
International Surveillance of Birth Defects
Fortunately, the U . S. and 23 other countries have developed large
scale ongoing monitoring systems (birth registries and hospital records)
since 1970 to overcome the limitations of small numbers and other biases
(errors in memory, over-or-under reporting).
These are designed as
an early warning system to prevent another epidemic of birth defects such
as those caused by rubella virus or thalidomide. 15
In a recent report ( 1985) Edmonds and James show trends for major
birth defects from 13 years of records (1970-1983) covering 13.0 million
births (live and stillborn), including over 20 percent of the U.S . hospital
deliveries. 1 6
Of the 33 major defects, the good news is that the trends for 17
defects are stable, 5 major defects are now decreasing, and only 11 de
fects show a statistically significant increase. Typical of the stable group
are Down Syndrome (Figure 2), club foot (Figure 3), and cleft lip with
or without cleft palate (Figure 4).
(See Figures 2-5 on the following
pages.) These are three major causes of infant damage, accounting for
over one-fourth of the major birth defects. Also, they are easily detected
at birth and do not require sophisticated medical technology for diagno
sis .
18

Typical of the increased group of birth defects is ventricular septa I
defect (Figure !:>).
This is one of the five cardiovascular anomalies
showing a statistically significant rise over recent years. These account
for less than one-fourth of the total major birth defects. Authors of the
report at the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta and experts
in other countries (Ireland, Hungary, Canada, Australia) point out that
this apparent rise in U.S. cardiovascular birth defects reflects better
· reporting in the U.S.
Recent advances in diagnostic techniques of
cardiology, especially in the northeastern section of the U. S . , have in
creased the number of cardiovascular defects rather than some new
etiologic agent at work in the environment. 17
The remaining six birth defects of the increased group include
congenital cataract, congenital hip dislocation, autosomal abnormality ex
cluding Down Syndrome and three G. U. anomalies (hypospadias, renal
agenesis, and urethral obstruction). Except for renal agenesis, all are
probably due to better diagnosis.
Typical of the decrease group of birth defects are two very signif
icant categories:
anencephaly (Figure 6) and spina bifida (Figure 7)
(See Figures on the following pages.) These neural tube defects in the
embryo represent a critical stage in development of the normal fetus.
They are readily diagnosed at birth without use of sophisticated medical
technology. Among all birth defects this nervous system category has
been documented to reflect environmental damage to the embryo, whether
human or animal.
These fetotoxins include radiation, chemotherapy,
cancer and epileptic drugs, and a variety of natural and synthetic toxins.
History indicates factors such as the devastating potato blight in
Ireland in 1845-1849, caused by the fungus (Phytophthora infestans). 18
19
An epidemic of neural tube defects occurred in Boston and . Rhode
Island in 1929-1932, presumably triggered by exposure to toxicants in
illegal booze or to changes in potato species and storage. 20 21 22
Like phocomelia, anencephaly and spina bifida were recognized in
ancient times. Many major birth defects are found in Egyptian mummies
and in ancient drawings and figurines; this suggests the possible role
of natural toxins, trace elements, or nutritional deficiencies long before
the industrial revolution.
Evidence from the United States and Hungary
The good news is that there is growing evidence that the much
feared "epidemic" of herbicide-triggered birth defects due to the alleged
environmental pollution of air, water, food, and soil has not yet occurred .
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The clinical epidemiology importance of this negative finding is that,
despite alleged or real errors in herbicide use, contaminants, handling,
spills, and residues that may have occurred in the past ten years in the
U . S., the most clearcut environmentally triggered and feared birth defect
has not occurred. The incubation period for human birth defects is at
most nine months from conception to delivery.
Over a 13-year period
there are a succession of 9-month experiments (over 17 gestation periods)
to test the hypothesis of herbicide-birth defects resulting from herbicide
exposure . The U.S. birth-monitoring system did not exist before 1970.
Independent confirmation of U.S. data comes from Hungary- -where
100 percent population based registry of births documents a decline in
stillbirths, a decline in anencephaly, and no increase in Down Syndrome,
cleft lip and palate, in the face of almost 10 years of increasing use of
2,4,5-T in Hungarian agriculture representing 40 percent of the country's
labor force (Figure 8). 2 3 In neither Eu rope nor the U.S. are the declines
attributable to prenatal diagnosis or elective abortion. 24
Birth Defects and Cancer:

Teratogens and Carcinogens

The reasons for emphasizing birth defects for this symposium are
threefold:
I . Cancers from pesticides will require many years for incubation
time to elapse (1-3 decades) and for discriminant analysis from other
carcinogens, including the aging process, heredity, diet, occupa
tion, use of tobacco and alcohol, exposure to coal tars, etc.
Nev
ertheless, evidence for any carcinogenic pesticide effect must be
monitored; the data will be controversial and inconclusive for some
time to come.
By contrast, the birth defect data are relatively
unbiased, standardized, and presently available for analysis.

11. Birth defects resulting from environmental damage (radiation,
ultra-violet light, drugs, toxins) are biolog ically linked to certain
cancers.
Neel refers to this linkage as the "carcinogen-mutagen
axis" . 25 • Childhood cancers and birth defects have been linked to
an underlying process of damage to essential cellular genetic
material. 26 For example, diethyl stilbestrol (DES) given to pregnant
mothers to prevent abortion resulted in both birth defects and
vaginal cancer in the offspring. Another example is leukemia, which
is at least eleven times higher in Down Syndrome than in normal
children. Ill. In response to the Public Health Service's objective
report of essentially good news (decreases of birth defects especially
in the category of RH hemolytic defects) , the media ( radio and
television) chose to emphasize the "bad news" (the increase in
cardiac defects which is probably not a true increase at all). 27
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Figure 2
U.S. Trends for
Down Syndrome,
1970-1983
(rates per 10,000 total births)
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Figure 3
U.S. Trends for
Clubfoot with/without
Anomalies of the
Central Nervous System,
1970-1983
(rates per 10,000 total births)
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Figure 4
U. S. Trends for
Cleft Lip with/without
Cleft Palate,
1970-1983
(rates per 10,000 total births)
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Figure 5
U.S. Trends for
Ventricular Septal Defect
1970-1983
(rates per 10,000 total births)
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Figure 6
U. S. Trends for
Anencephaly,
1970-1983
(rates per 10,000 total births)
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Figure 7
U.S. Trends for
Spina Bifida,
1970-1983
(rates per 10,000 total births)
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Figure 8
USAGE OF 2,4,5-T,* STILLBIRTHS AND
SELECTED BIRTH DEFECT RATES IN HUNGARY, (21)
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Why would the media underreport the "good" news and overreport
the inconclusive "bad" news? One can only speculate on: (a) the failure
of communication between reporter and experts (b) the attempt to satisfy
a presumed public appetite for a new health scare, (c) a climate of health
consciousness in the U.S. today bordering upon mass hypochondriasis
(Table 3), 28 and (d) a high level of public distrust of scientists, gov
ernment and industry whenever health or environmental issues are con
cerned.
As an epidemiologist, I have reason for hope. I agree with Harry
S . Truman who wrote . . . "My confidence in evolution of man ' s works.
I have never seen pessimists make anything work or contribute anything
of lasting value. It takes idealists to make the world work. " 32 In terms
of birth defects and public attitudes, at least three misconceptions are
at work:
(1) The natural history of birth defects as a background occurrence
(two major defects and one minor defect per 100 births) is not un
derstood.
Expectations exceed reality.
There is a "Mirage of
Health" described by Dubos in 1959 in Table 4. The public expects
every pregnancy to be planned and every conception to result in a
"perfect baby" (Table 5).

TABLE 3
HEAL TH CONCERNS IN THE UNITED STATES
APPROPRIATE OR NOT?
FACT:

Health expenditures have doubled as percent of Gross
National Product from 1960 (5 .3%) to 1983 (10.8%).

FACT :

A 1984 three-community survey in Louisiana revealed
that 1 of 3 adults scored clinically high on an index
for hypochondriasis (overconcern with one's health). 27

28
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Figure 9
Example of the Movies Exploiting Public Fears
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SECTION II
HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES

RISK ASSESSMENT AND PESTICIDES : A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
William F. Steirer, Jr., Ph.D.
Associate Professor of History
Department of History
Clemson University

For a historian to participate in a symposium on risk assessment
pertaining to agricultural pesticides is unusual, as historians have dis
played little interest in the subject of risk assessment in general, much
less as it pertains to something as specific as pesticides. In my own case,
I owe the invitation to participate primarily to my ties to the Kellogg grant
committee at Clemson, the sponsors of this symposium.
But with histo
rians showing so little interest in the subject it will not be difficult to
offer a historical perspective both distinctive and challenging.
Philosopher Kristen Shrader-Frechette pleads in Science Policy,
Ethics, and Economic Methodology: Some Problems of Technological As
sessment and Environmental-Impact Analysis for a greater inclusion of
ethical comments in technological assessment, and, accordingly, calls for
the inclusion of philosophy along with the usual disciplines of sociology,
chemistry, political science, and economics.
She, apparently, also de
liberately excludes history from such a team. 1 And I am aware that the
lineup of speakers advancing disciplinary prospectives at this symposium
progresses hierarchially from those with "hard" perspectives on technol
ogy to those with one so "soft" that it barely exists and that the focus
at the symposium comes from a presentist assumpt ion that is alien to
historians.
Technological assessment in formal terms is such a new proposition,
dating as it does back only to 1966, that those who early saw the pos
sibilities present in devising a new way of looking at technologies that
would turn technology from being an independent element in the process
of social change into a dependent determinant within that process should
hardly be blamed for efforts to maintain an air of mystery about the
process. Technological assessment is the "thorough and balanced analysis
of all significant primary, secondary, indirect, and delayed consequences
of society, the environment or the economy. " 2 Risk assessment must be
thought of as a way of emphasizing that the central element in techno
logical assessment is the balancing of benefits and hazards in a subjec
tive, qualitative way.
Risk assessment is, therefore, just another way
of describing technological assessment, but with the difference that em
phasis is placed on "risk" being assessed rather than on "technology,"
and the discussion centers on people instead of technology.
Certainly, historians, once they penetrate the clouds of mystery that
swirl about technological assessment, will find that a knowledge of a
particular technology is not as essential in adequately assessing the ef
fects of that technology upon society as is the understanding of the na
ture of the human experiences that they bring to the task.
Where the
other disciplines represented at their symposium either feature a way of
predicting future patterns or feature a sense of the "ought" in human
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experience as part of their respective methodologies, historians offer
neither.
Instead, historians possess an inherent disciplinary humility
that comes from their knowledge that they can neither predict future
patterns nor offer a set of "oughts" as guides to human behavior. Part
of that humility comes from a methodological refusal to moralize about past
human beings, to find instead the answers to "how" and "why" men acted
in particular ways.
The best among historians evaluate and judge but
do not see their function as being "hanging judges."
As a result, historians possess a deep-seated susp1c1on of those who
would predict the actions that men will take in the future because as
historians they know full well that the past motivations and behavior of
human beings continually demonstrate how unpredictable human beings
have been and the rather haphazard effect that "oughts" have in human
affairs. So historians, believing, wrongly I might add, that technological
assessment and risk assessment are cleverly disguised attempts to predict
the future paths of human beings, have remained uninterested in the
process.
And, in turn, those charged with developing methods of as
sessing risks and technology have been uninterested in possible con
tributions by historians.
The challenge of persuading historians to recognize technological
assessment and risk assessment for the useful processes that they are
does not seem particularly formidable.
They must simply be disabused
of their thinking that predicting future actions is involved, and recognize
that the process of risk assessment entails establishing priorities, setting
criteria, and accumulating data in an integrated package so that society
can determine if the potential "good" in the technology outweighs the
potential "evil" and what to do about the technology in either case.
That task is easier than persuading those who have staked out claims
to expertise in risk assessment procedures that a historical perspective
not only would be helpful but also even essential to creating a proper
approach to assessing risks in technology.
Why is this so?
In our
presentist-minded world, historians are often looked upon, fondly, but
nonetheless firmly, as anachronisms with little to offer in solving today's
problems.
"What good is history anyway" is the challenging question
often asked by people in all parts of society. And to many nonhistorians,
it is purely a rhetorical question needing no answer.
But answers are available.
For one thing, a historical perspective
can provide a sense of what the accretion of tech no logy has meant in our
society. More scientists are alive today than the total of all those who
lived previously in the world's history. The same can be said for engi
neers and technicians. This adds up to a realization that the rate of
change induced by technology has increased exponentially in the past two
generations with every prospect of an even more rapid increase in the
future.
Furthermore, historians, I would argue, understand better than
scientists, engineers, or social scientists how people have handled those
changes in the past, what risks they have been prepared to take, and,
especially, what has been at specific points in the past the domino
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effect -- the connections - -brought on by the accumulated advances in
technology . Historians can bring to the assessment process the ability
to isolate factors from both their temporal and spatial contexts and to
study what effect those factors had in generating later factors.
It is
what Kenneth Burke claimed to be doing in the television series, "Con
nections . " In it Burke traced the relationships of one set of factors with
another set however unrelated they look to be on a superficial level. It
is the acknowledgment that the relationships that exist in human society
among people, things, institutions, and beliefs are multi-faceted and
layers deep, and it is the understanding about what might be done with
the knowledge gained about those relationships that historians offer to
assessment teams .
As a matter of fact, historians do risk assessment as part of their
scholarly routine. The historians' attempts to sort out the past is in
large part the effort to learn how people have evaluated and assessed
the potential (and real) risks that were confronted in the past. What
prompted people in the past to make the moves that they did? Can our
knowledge, if we can accumulate in sufficient amounts, help us under
stand how people may respond in the future to technological innovations?
Can we apply what we know about past risk assessments to the present?

Historians believe that the answer to all these questions is--yes!
In dealing with people' s motivations, they come to understand how com
plex are those motivations.
Historians assume that human beings are
rational beings until they prove by their behavior that they are not .
It is clear that, in acting rationally, people can and do naturally balance
the risks and benefits present in any situation in a subjective, qualitative
way . They can do so because they have the ability to learn the differ
ences between right and wrong and knowing the differences can poten
tially choose right over wrong.
Furthermore, as already stated, historians are fully aware of the
old cliche that "the road to hell is paved with good intentions." They
have observed how many people have moved down that road.
History
consists, after all, of the written record of humanity's actions on this
earth, failures as well as successes, wrong choices as well as right ones .
As Adam and Eve demonstrated during the first chance that humans had
to assess the risk present in a situation, the choice came down on the
wrong side.
But, since looking at the Bible for confirmation may not be appro
priate for everyone, let's look at the earliest history of agriculture.
How did those early humans learn which plants to ennoble, which were
not dangerous? How did they learn which plants could be made to grow
in a reasonably well-controlled ecosystem?
Which plants were edible?
Which plants, harmless, if not exactly primitive and surely lacking in
page after page of mathematical equations and formulas, was necessary?
That process deserves to be called risk assessment, for is not that what
they were doing? The number of times that wrong choices were made,
risks mistakenly assessed, undoubtedly was frequent and the conse
quences severe.
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As historians we try to recreate the situation, look at it from the
perspective of the actors, ask the same questions they asked (if we can),
see what answers they arrived at. In this way we come to know how they
identified what risks they faced. We come to understand that, however
urgently they sought to recognize what would be the consequences of
their actions, the time frame of the individuals or groups of individuals
involved is both all that counts and counts for nothing.
Risk is a people problem - it is people who fear the loss of life,
injury, and the unknown. The people who fear the risks that are po
tentially present in technology - in this case, pesticides - are people like
us and like those who love us. We cannot impersonalize the process of
risk assessment without our work becoming a meaningless intellectual
exercise. And so in dealing with the contemporary scene, we all too often
find ourselves in a "catch 22" situation. Our personal involvement makes
it impossible to interpret the material critically to place it in a broader
context. Historians, by using the perspective of time, can describe some
of the pitfalls and opportunities that exist in risk management, which
otherwise our intimate involvement in the world keeps us from examining.
The task that historians would perform in assessing the risks po
tentially present in any pesticide available for use in our society is to
provide an objective framework in which past experiences can operate.
Historians know that people do learn from the past, but only what they
want to learn from that past; the rest they discard. Historians can help
with this dynamic because they understand it.
One of those matters that historians have learned from the past is
how much life is risk and how our stay on this earth is inseparable from
life and existence. Humans are doomed to live with a high level of un
certainty - a level that, to me at any rate, does not seem much lessened
in spite of our increasingly formalized ways of trying to fathom what lies
ahead. Life and risk are synonymous terms, so much so that the question
we really face about pesticides and risk is not whether there shall be
risk involved, but how much risk we will tolerate. We should not talk
about yes or no, but rather about how much or how far.
Finally, it seems to me that historians, versed in the knowledge of
the limitations revealed by human beings in the past, can act as the brake
upon humans' overarching desire to master all and to bend all creation
to humans' will.
Let us develop a sound procedure where risks can be
assessed - let us manage risks but do so always within a framework that
recognizes our limitations and the limitations of available technology. A
brief look at two case studies will help me show what I mean.
In the period, 1947-74, the agricultural use of pesticides increased
ten-fold. In the same period that saw such a dramatic rise in pesticide
use, the rate of crop loss rose by a factor of two. In America, although
acreage treated for pests rose from 1 to 52 percent, crop losses of corn
have increased almost four-fold.
The natural ecosystem, has been de
stroyed by the widespread use of pesticides with the result being to bind
agriculturalists to a policy that brings neither immediate nor long-term
advantages. 3
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A similar situation can be observed in the case of the spruce
budworm. Before people interfered in the natural process, the ecological
system of which the budworm was a part could have served as a superb
example of how an eco-system should work . Normally rare, the spruce
budworm breaks out in large numbers every 30 years or so.
The
infestation then becomes so great that a large proportion of the older
forest is defoliated and killed.
This eliminates much of the insect's
habitat so that it returns to being a rare pest during the period that a
vigorous young forest grows back . 4
Unfortunately, commercial lumbering is difficult under these condi
tions; so in the 1950's, when an eruption took place, pesticides were
applied liberally. This meant that forests remained in a native state, the
very habitat in which the spruce budworm th rived. The budworm pop
ulation has, therefore, been maintained at an artificially high level so that
it continues to be a serious threat to commercial lumbering interests.
Continuous and expensive applications of pesticides only serve to prevent
the budworm from totally destroying the spruce forests but cannot do
more than that. The end result, though, is the peril this behavior has
placed people in. 5
These serve as examples of how the lack of risk assessment has
produced serious consequences, and all those invo lved in risk assessment
can see the lessons to be learned from these situations. Yet, it is his
torians, who, as primary keepers of the past, are most likely to use the
experiences judiciously in future situations. I happen to think that had
historians been consulted in the beginning stages of each of these "cri
ses," they would have called upon their sense of the past and suggested
that the participants humble themselves before the unknown and cau
tiously, ever so cautiously, venture forth with a "solution." They would
have done so, I think, not because they knew more or better, but be
cause, as I have said previously, they know how uncertain the future
is and that, lacking any ability to see into the future, a conservative
approach to acting is called for. We know the future, historians would
have said, only as well as we understand the past.
But however that may be, the important thing here is that all such
accounts only reinforce the fundamental assumption of historians that the
burden of proof is upon those who would argue that almost all risks are
tolerable. And also, such persons must "prove" what the limits of that
toleration are within the bounds of a future dictated in large measure
by what historians know about the past.
In summary, then, I can suggest that historians can bring three
things generally missing from the risk assessment process to that proc
ess.
One, they will bring the sense of humility that is built into the
discipline as a cautionary component. Two, they would make a real effort
to keep all assessment activity within the heritage and cultural framework
of society.
And, three, they would ask the "right" questions so that
"right" answers can be discerned.
Taken together these three prop
ositions should constitute sufficient reason to include historians into risk
assessments of pesticides in the future.
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On July 4, 1985, scores of Americans were not celebrating their
country ' s independence but were if! hospital emergency rooms.
They
were innocent victims of pesticide residues. Days after the poisonings,
California officials ordered more than a million striped watermelons to be
destroyed. Aldicarb, banned for use on melons in the U.S., had ruined
at least five percent of the annual watermelon crop. Outside America,
problems with pesticides loom even larger. A recent study by a former
Environmental Protection Agency scientist (who worked in the Office of
Pesticide Programs and the Office of Toxic Substances) estimates that
pesticides cause 10,000 deaths and 400,000 illnesses per year
worldwide . 1
Stopping such deaths is not an easy matter because pesticides are
also often life savers .
To increase agricultural productivity to meet
rising food demand and to improve public health in tropical areas suf
fering from insect - borne diseases, pest control is necessary. Without
adequate pest control, up to one-third of Asian rice production could
be lost to insects annually; 2 and up to 20 percent of U. S. fruit and
vegetable crops could be lost to plant diseases each year. 3
Even with
dramatic increases in pesticide use in recent decades, the percentage of
crops lost to pests apparently has not declined. 4
Pesticides present a dilemma. As their hazards increase, so does
the need for pest control.
As they become more and more expensive,
so does the apparent economic need for them. Although they have opened
new ways of improving agriculture and public health, they have closed
other ways, and they have made us dependent on them.
One way of resolving the practical side of the pesticide dilemma is
through integrated pest management ( I PM):
managing pests better
without excessive pollution.
All IPM strategies are a matter of deter
mining how pests, crops, weather, climate, soils, and topography interact
in a particular location and then deciding carefully about how, when, and
where to apply pesticides.
The U.S . Office of Technology Assessment
estimates that if 1PM were employed, pesticide use in U. S . agriculture
could be reduced by as much as 75 percent. 5
Although IPM might help resolve the practica l side of the pesticide
dilemma , by reducing risks while protecting crops, a larger conceptual
problem exists .
How is one to identify, estimate, and evaluate risks
associated with pesticides? There are no methods, taken either singly
or together, which provide wholly objective assessments of pesticide risk.
Instead, there are numerous value-laden methodologies, the use of each
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of which often raises as many conceptual questions as the practical ones
it is designed to answer.
The methodologies are value-laden because
every situation evaluated by risk assessors is empirically underdetermined
in some way.
As a consequence of this empirical underdetermination,
assessors are forced to make myriad value judgments, all within the
confines of accepted risk methodology.
In subsequent pages, I shall outline some of the central occasions
in risk-assessment methodology which force the assessor to make value
judgments, interpretations, and extrapolations. I attempt to clarify risk
assessment in three main ways.
First, I outline some of the major con
ceptual and practical problems associated with identifying, estimating,
and evaluating risks. Second, I outline three dilemmas which, regardless
of progress in scientific methods such as those of epidemiology, are likely
to continue to pose nearly insurmountable obstacles for the risk
evaluation stage of risk assessment. I call these three obstacles (1) the
Contributor's Dilemma, (2) the Threshold Dilemma, and (3) the Consent
Dilemma.
Third, I close by suggesting two ways in which to improve
risk-analysis methods and to avoid the worst consequences of the value
judgments encountered within it.
Risk Analysis
Widely touted as a "developing science, " 6 the new discipline of risk
assessment or risk analysis is currently being used by engineers, stat
isticians, epidemiologists, economists, and policymakers, both to identify
technological threats to our health and safety and to evaluate their ac
ceptability. The goal of quantitative risk assessment is to deliver society
from the twin extremes of dangerous and unrestrained technological de
velopment and from ignorant and paranoid opposition to all new technol
ogies. Instead, it offers a middle ground, an analytic framework within
which thousands of risks can be comparatively evaluated--from those
posed by liquefied natural gas facilities and nuclear fission to those
caused by new contraceptives and pesticides.
In employing a comparative framework within which diverse risks
may be evaluated, assessors aim to give policymakers a rational basis for
decisions about health and safety. They provide schemes showing how
to save the most lives for the available dollars and how to spend funds
so as to reduce the greatest hazards first.
Risk assessment enables
society, first, to maximize the benefits of government expenditures for
health and safety. Second, it promotes equity and consistency in allo
cation of funds among safety programs.
As one thinker put it, risk assessment provides a framework for
asking "why OSHA intends, in a set of proposed regulations on coke-oven
emissions, to protect the lives of steelworkers at $5 million each, while
a national Pap smear screening program that would save women's lives
at less than $100,000 each has gone unfunded. " 7 In sum, risk assessment
responds to our reasonable demands for efficiency and equity in reducing
risks.
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The greatest liability of quantified risk assessment, according to its
critics, is that it attempts to reduce qualitatively diverse risks to mere
mathematical probabilities and numbers of fatalities . They also charge
that it threatens to remove health and safety from democratic social
control and to place it in the hands of experts who want to dictate when
and why many of society's fears about technological hazards are irra
tional .
Apart from whether opponents of risk analysis are correct in their
allegations about its political liabilities, there are other risks of risk as
sessment.
These conceptual risks are important precisely because they
often are not recognized by practitioners of risk analysis . Because they
are not, risk-assessment conclusions sometimes err in relying on a number
of crucial, but unrecognized, value judgments.
Risk-assessment methods are generally dividied into three classes
corresponding to the three stages of risk analysis: risk identification,
risk estimation, and risk evaluation.
The standard view, according to
Starr, Whipple, Okrent, Maxey, Cohen, Lee, and other well-known risk
assessors, is that expert methods employed in the first two stages of risk
identification and risk estimation are objective and neutral, whereas the
methods employed in the last stage, risk evaluation, a re somewhat sub
jective and evaluative . 8
The Three Stages of Risk Analysis
In claiming that risk identification and risk estimation a re objective
and value-free, Starr, Whipple, and others forget a variety of unavoid
able evaluative judgments that arise in connection with risk methods .
Let's outline briefly some of these conceptual or methodological risks of
risk assessment, and then sketch some ways to avoid their worst conse
quences .
"Risk" is generally defined as a compound measure of the perceived
probability and magnitude of adverse effect, and it is often expressed
in terms of average annual probability of fatality. Each of the three areas
of risk assessment--risk identification, risk estimation, and risk
evaluation--poses its own conceptual problems . 9
It is difficult, first, to identify risks because each of the five
commonly used methods of identification has serious defects whose pres
ence requires the assessor to make evaluative judgments . The use of
case clusters, for example, looking for adverse effects to appear in a
particular place, is helpful (1) only when specific hazards cause unique
diseases and (2) only when the population at risk is known in some detail .
Since often it is not known whether conditions ( 1) and (2) a re satisfied,
especially in cases involving new risks, the assessor must interpret the
situation as best he can.
Comparison of compounds in terms of structural toxicology, a second
method of risk identification, likewise is problematic. It reveals only that
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a toxin, for example, has the same structure as a carcinogen. Yet, in
using this method, assessors typically assume that this similarity of
structure is sufficient to determine that a substance is a positive
carcinogen. Use of a third identifying method, mutagenicity assays, also
relies on a normative judgment.
It is weak in that it rests on the as
sumption that most chemical carcinogens are mutagens; mutagencity
assays are rarely sufficient to support the conclusion that a particular
mutagen is also carcinogenic.
A fourth method of risk identification, long-term animal bioassays,
is a weak method for identifying risks in that it depends on the inference
that results from animal experiments are applicable to humans.
A fifth class of methods, biostatistical epidemiological studies, are
more sophisticated case clusters.
They aim to show an association be
tween an agent and a disease. The obvious deficiencies with this method
are that it is often difficult to accumulate the relevant evidence, partic
ularly if exposure is at low dosage or if the effects are delayed, like
cancers with latency periods of up to 40 years. In the absence of com
plete data and long years of testing, assessors are forced to interpret
and to extrapolate from the data which they do have. Moreover, most
substances are not even tested using epidemiological methods. Th is is
because, apart from other sources of hazards, there are roughly 60,000
chemicals used in various manufacturing processes, and at least 1,000
new ones are added each year. 10 Deciding which of the chemicals to test,
when not all can be tested by means of this method, is perhaps one of
the greatest evaluative judgments in risk identification.
At the second stage of risk assessment, risk estimation, one is
concerned primarily with determining three things: a dose-response re
lationship for a particular hazard, the population at risk, and the dose
it receives from the hazard.
Dose-response methods are conceputally
problematic because they require extrapolation from high to low doses
and from animals to humans.
The problems associated with such ex
trapolation a re well known, as when health physicists try to extrapolate
a dose-response curve for low-level radiation exposure, given data points
only for higher-level exposures.
Environmentalists, industry represen
tatives, and government bodies have each extrapolated to a different
dose-response curve for low-level effects of radiation.
On the basis of
their differing value judgments, they have concluded that low-level ef
fects of radiation are, respectively, very dangerous, not dangerous at
all, and moderately dangerous. 11
Estimating the population at risk and the dose received is just as
problematic, for at least two reasons. Actual measurements of particular
doses, e.g., of a chemical, cannot be made in all situations; as a con
sequence, a mathematical model of assumed exposure must be used. Such
estimates are also problematic because seemingly unimportant pathways
of exposure can assume great significance owing to biomagnification due
to food-chain and synergistic effects. Moveover, it is rare that a sub
stance is uniformly distributed across pathways or across time.
For all
these reasons, the assessor is forced to make a number of interpretative
judgments.
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At the third stage of risk assessment, risk evaluation, analysts
typically determine whether a risk is acceptable to society. They employ
at least four different methods: risk-cost-benefit analysis ( RCBA), re
vealed preferences, expressed preferences, and natural standards.
RCBA is widely used and consists simply of converting the risks,
costs, and benefits associated with a particular project to monetary terms
and then aggregating each of them to determine whether the risks and
costs outweigh the benefits . 12 The great advantage of RCBA is that it
allows assessors to calculate how to save the greatest number of lives for
the fewest dollars. Its most obvious deficiency is that simply adding up
risks, costs, and benefits ignores who gets what, the equity of the
distribution .
In using RCBA, assessors are thus forced to make the
highly evaluative ethical judgment that the magnitude of risks, costs,
and benefits is more important than their distribution and that distri
bution need not be taken account of at all.
The second method of risk evaluation, revealed preferences, consists
of making inductive inferences about acceptable risk on the basis of the
levels of risk which existed in the past. 13 The most worrisome assump
tion in this method is that past societal risk levels reveal correct or de
sirable risk levels for the present. This assumption requires one to judge
that the present ought to be like the past regarding risk and that what
risk was accepted in the past ought to have been accepted. Both of these
assumptions involve highly evaluative judgments, since past levels of risk
may be indefensible in certain aspects and since our ethical obligations
regarding present risk may be greater than those regarding past risk.
The third method of risk evaluation, expressed preferences, consists
of using psychometric surveys to determine the acceptability of particular
risks . 14 It is built on the questionable assumption that the preferences
people express via instruments such as surveys provide reliable indica
tors as to acceptable risks. Obviously, however, preferences are not
always authentic indicators of welfare: some persons have irrational fears
and other persons are too ignorant to realize a serious risk. This method
also requires the assessor to make a number of evaluative judgments
whenever he encounters inconsistencies in survey preferences or failure
of the responses to correspond with actual behavior regarding risk.
The fourth method of risk evaluation, natural standards, uses
geological and biological criteria to determine risk levels current du ring
the evolution of the species. 15 This method is based on the assumption
that if a particular level of risk was present in the past, then that same
level is acceptable at present . The obvious problem, however, is again
that because a risk "is" present naturally does not mean that we "ought"
to allow it to remain, especially if it can be avoided or if no overarching
benefits arise from allowing the risk to remain high.
Moreover, since
the method is based on a "natural standard" for each different hazard,
it totally fails to take account of synergistic or cumulative effects that
could be many orders of magnitude greater than the actual "standard
level" of exposure.
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Risk Assessment and Values
All the assumptions, extrapolations, and inferences built into each
of the methods in the three stages of risk assessment appear to arise
because nearly every situation of risk identification, estimation, or
evaluation is empirically underdetermined.
Because it is empirically
underdetermined, the assessor is forced to make some value judgments
so as to interpret the data available to him. At root, these assumptions
and inferences often reduce to the problem of getting a grip on causality .
This is difficult since causes are not seen; they are inferred on the basis
of their effects. Cancers, for example, don't wear tags saying they were
caused by their subjects' smoking, or by use of oral contraceptives, or
by diet drinks, or by breathing the emissions of the chemical plant next
door.
Moreover, we know statistically how much of one agent causes
cancer, but we don't know in individual cases whether a given agent
caused a particular cancer.
We are only able to infer what caused a
certain cancer.
A classic example of the difficulty of establishing causality of harm,
given a certain probability of risk, occurred during the fifties and the
sixties, when U. S. servicemen were exposed to above-ground, nuclear
weapons tests in western U.S. and in the south Pacific. Many of them
were within five miles of ground zero for as many as 23 separate explo
sions, or were marched to within 300 yards of ground zero, immediately
after detonation. Yet, of the half a million soldiers so exposed, only ten
have won benefits when they or their survivors claimed that their deaths
and injuries were caused by the fallout . 16 True, a good risk assessor
can use statistical methods to determine when there is a significant rise
in particular deaths or injuries. But in the end, all he has is a corre
lation and never a strict proof of causality, even in experiments with
strict controls .
As a consequence, there is always some data lacking,
some need for inference, extrapolation, and simplification. This means
that even the best situations are empirically underdetermined and force
one into the realm of doing philosophy, and making value judgments under
the guise of doing science.
Two Problematic Risk Assessments
Sometimes the philosophy underlying a particular risk assessment
is done well; other times, the methodological assumptions are so suspect,
on logical, ethical, and epistemological grounds, that the resulting risk
estimates are of questionable value. One famous example of such a risk
assessment is that of Herbert lnhaber . His study was commissioned by
the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board and then summarized in Sci
ence. The major conclusions of his study, which estimated the risks from
alternative energy technologies, were ( 1) that the risk from conventional
energy systems, like nuclear or coal power, is less than that from non
conventional systems, like solar or wind energy, and (2) that non
catastrophic risks are greater than catastrophic risks . 17
How did lnhaber arrive at his surprising conclusions? He made some
highly questionable evaluative assumptions. In estimating the risk posed
by particular energy technologies, he assumed, for example, that all
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electricity was of utility-grid quality. 18 This means that the low-risk
benefits of solar space heating and hot-water heating, indeed the low
temperatu re forms of solar which could supply 40 percent of U. S. energy
needs at little risk, were ignored. Another assumption central to his
risk estimates is that all nonconventional energy technologies have coal
backups . 19 This means, for example, that in the case of solar thermal
electric, 89 percent of the risk attributed to it comes not from the solar
(especially construction of components) but from the coal backup, which
he classifies as a solar risk! Moreover, lnhaber assumes that nuclear
fission requires no backup, 2 0 even though these plants experience a down
time of approximately 33 percent per year for checkups, refueling, and
repairs .
In the area of risk evaluation, lnhaber's assumptions are just as
questionable. When he aggregates and compares all lost work days, for
all energy technologies, he ignores the fact that lost work days are more
or less severe, depending on the nature of the accident causing them
and whether or not they are sequential. On lnhaber's scheme, a lost
work day due to cancer or to exposure to a toxin with mutagenic effects
(likely to affect one's children) is no different than a lost work day from
a sprained ankle . 21
lnhaber made a similar questionable assumption in evaluating the
severity of risks. Unlike other risk assessors, he totally ignored the
distinction between catastrophic/noncatastrophic risks and assumed that
1, 000 construction workers, each falling off a roof and dying in separate
accidents, was no different than 1,000 workers dying because of a cat
astrophic accident in a nuclear fuel fabrication plant . 22 Were one to trace
lnhaber's methods, step by step, it would be clear that virtually every
assumption he makes in estimating and evaluating alternative risks has
the effect of increasing his alleged conventional risks and decreasing his
alleged nonconventional risks.
Another example of a risk analysis with questionable evaluative as
sumptions is the Ramsey and Russell 23 article in a recent issue of Public
Policy.
In this classic piece, Ramsey and Russell calculated the total
public and occupational risk from nuclear and coal energy cycles. They
discounted future deaths at five percent per year and then concluded
that coal power was ten times more risky than nuclear energy . If a zero
discount rate were used for deaths, however, so that immediate and
long-term deaths were weighted the same, then their conclusion would
reverse by three orders of magnitude:
nuclear energy is more than a
hundred times more risky than generation of electricity from coal.
Even if risk-assessment situations were not empirically underdeter
mined, for all the reasons already surveyed, and even if persons such
as lnhaber, Russell, and Ramsey avoided their questionable means of
aggregating and estimating risks, values would unavoidably enter the
risk-assessment process . This is because value judgments are often the
only ways to resolve some of the ethical dilemmas facing risk assessors.
Consider three of the most prominent such difficulties . I call them (1)
the contributor's dilemma, (2) the threshold dilemma, and (3) the consent
dilemma.
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Ethical Judgments and Risk Evaluation
The contributor's dilemma is this. Citizens are subject to numerous
small risks, e . g., to certain carcinogens, each of which is allegedly ac
ceptable; yet, together such exposures are clearly unacceptable . Each
of the numerous carcinogens to which we are exposed, e.g . , asbestos,
vinyl chloride, radiation, is alleged to be acceptable because it is below
the threshold at which some statistically significant increase in harm oc
curs. Yet, statistically speaking, 25 to 33 percent of us are going to
die from cancers, 90 percent of which are environmentally induced and
hence theoretically preventable. 24
Many of the cancers are obviously
caused by the aggregation of numerous exposures to carcinogens, no one
of which alone is alleged to be harmful.
The contributor's dilemma is especially problematic for risk assessors
because it forces them both to assume (in the case of aggregate risks)
and not to assume (in the case of individual risks) that the whole risk
faced by an individual is greater than the sum of the parts of that risk.
Risk assessors who condone subthreshold risks, but who condemn the
deaths caused by the aggregate of those subthreshold risks, are some
thing like the bandits who eat the tribesmen's lunches in the following
famous story of Jonathan Glover.
Suppose a village contains 100 unarmed tribesmen eating their lunch.
One hundred hungry armed bandits descend on the village, and each
bandit at gun-point takes one tribesman ' s lunch and eats it.
The
bandits then go off, each one having done a discriminable amount
of ha rm to a single tribesman. Next week, the bandits a re tempted
to do the same thing again, but are troubled by new-found doubts
about the morality of such a raid. Their doubts are put to rest
by one of their number (a government risk assessor] ....
They then raid the village, tie up the tribesmen, and look at their
lunches.
As expected, each bowl of food contains 100 baked
beans....
Instead of each bandit eating a single plateful as last
week, each (of the 100 bandits) takes one bean from each (of the
100 plate(s). They leave after eating all the beans, pleased to have
done no harm, as each has done no more than subthreshold harm
to each person. 25
The obvious question raised by this example is how a risk assessor
can say that both subthreshold exposures are harmless, as the data in
dicate, and yet that the sum, or contribution, of these exposures causes
great harm. It appears that risk assessors need to amend their theory
regarding additive or synergistic risks like cancer.
The th res hold di lemma poses many of the same problems as the
contributor's dilemma.
It consists of the fact that society must declare
some threshold for the acceptability of a given risk (e.g., that it would
cause less than a 10 6 increase in one's average annual probability of
fatality), since a zero-risk society is impossible.
Yet, no threshold
standard is able to provide equal protection from harm to all citizens.
Choosing the 10 6 standard appears eminently reasonable, both because
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society must attempt to reduce larger risks first and because 10 6 is the
natural-hazards mortality rate.
This choice poses us with a dilemma,
however, because it is a standard based on average annual probability
of fatality .
Because this 10 6 th res hold seems acceptable, on the average ,
however, does not mean that it is acceptable to each individual. Most
civil rights , for example, are not accorded on the basis of the average
needs of persons but on the basis of individual rights.
For instance ,
we do not accord constitutionally guaranteed civil rights to public edu 
cation on the basis of average characteristics of students.
If we did,
then retarded children or gifted children would have rights only to ed 
ucation for children at the average level. Instead, we say that according
"equal" civil rights to education means according "comparable education , "
given one ' s aptitudes and needs.
That is why the state can provide
special schools for both the retarded and the gifted .
This example from the field of education raises an interesting
question for risk assessment; if civil rights to education are accorded
on the basis of individual, not average, characteristics, then why are
civil rights to equal protection from risks not accorded on the basis of
individual, rather than average, characteristics? Why is a 10 6 average
th res hold accepted for everyone, without compensation, when adopting
it poses risks higher than 10 6 for the elderly, for children, for persons
with previous exposures to carcinogens , for those with allergies, for
persons who must lead sedentary lives, and for the poor? Blacks, for
example , face higher risks from air pollution than do whites, even though
they share the same "average" exposure. 26
A third dilemma faced by assessors who must estimate and evaluate
risks is the consent dilemma. It a rises from the fact that imposition of
certain risks is legitimate only after consent is obtained from the affected
parties, and that all those genuinely able to give legitimate consent are
precisely those who likely will never do so.
Probably the best example of the consent dilemma arises in workplace
situations. Here there is an alleged compensating wage differential noted
both by economists and risk assessors. According to the theory behind
the alleged differential, the more risky the occupation, the higher the
wage required to compensate the worker for bearing the risk, all things
being equal . 2 7 Moreover, imposition of these higher workplace risks is
legitimate apparently only after the worker consents, with knowledge of
the risks involved, to perform the work for the agreed-upon wage. But
the dilemma arises once one considers who is most likely to give legitimate
informed consent.
It is a person who is well educated and adequately
informed about the risk, especially its long-term and probabilistic effects.
It is a person who is not forced, under dire financial constraints, to take
a job he knows is likely to harm him. Yet, sociological data reveal that,
as education and income rise, persons are less willing to take risky jobs
and that those who do so are primarily poorly educated or financially
strapped. 2 • This means that the very set of persons least able to give
free, informed consent to workplace risks are precisely those who most
often are said to give consent.
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If this observation about workplace risk is accurate, then medical
experimentation may have something to teach us about risk assessment.
We know that the promise of early release for a prisoner who consents
to risky medical experimentation provides a highly coercive context that
could jeopardize his legitimate consent.
So also high wages for a des
perate worker who consents to take a risky job provides a highly coercive
context which could jeopardize his legitimate consent. What is the way
out of this dilemma?
Two Suggestions for Improving Risk Analysis
Although there is no space here to develop extensive arguments for
the best ways to avoid some of the most detrimental effects of the three
dilemmas just outlined, there are two possible solutions. One is to use
weighted risk-cost-benefit analysis (RCBA), putting ethical weights on
each of the RCBA parameters to counteract the consequences of the di
lemmas noted earlier. Thus, for example, when we faced the contribu
tor's dilemma, we could put heavier weights, or costs, on allegedly
acceptable individual risks which combine to form unacceptable aggregate
risks . 29
The other solution is to use an adversary system of assessment.
This amounts to requiring that a number of different risk assessments
be performed for the same project, and that each assessment employ al
ternative ethical and methodological assumptions as the basis of its cal
culations.
Once these alternative assessments were completed, then
policymakers and the public could debate their merits and observe how
alternative methodological and ethical assumptions generate alternative
risk estimates and evaluations. 3 0 Such a strategy would allow the public
and policymakers to choose not only which risks they want but also which
philosophies (ethics and methodologies) to use in identifying, estimating,
and evaluating those risks.
Using both ethically weighted assessment and adversary assessment
amounts to spelling out our philosophical assumptions as well as our
conclusions about risk.
These steps would take us closer to the
public-policy ideal of Albert Einstein, who urged that all important issues
be publicly debated in "the market place of ideas . "
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TECHNOLOGY RISK ASSESSMENT AND THE IS-OUGHT FALLACY:
A DISCUSSION OF SHRADER-FRECHETTE
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The whole of Science Policy, Ethics and Economic Methodology argues
forcefully for a radical change in current techno logy assessment meth
odology. Kristin Shrader-Frechette argues convincingly for the necessity
of input from ethicists and philosophers as well as the general public
through democratic participation in order that all the evidence might be
weighed from all possible standpoints prior to reaching a policy decision.
My whole-hearted agreement with her main conclusion and contentions
does not stop there but follows her through most of her reasons and
arguments as well.
However, I have a problem with one small part of
her argument; this in turn offers me the opportunity of arguing for my
own main concern, namely, the grounding required for an intrinsic value
for our environment.
I also believe that a laying bare of the fallacy
contained in the usual understanding of the " naturalistic fallacy", will
help to further strengthen her position, while opening the door for the
next step to a better approach to TA's and EIA's that is, the search for
a basis for philosophically sound normative positions.
Under the heading of "The Fallacy of Unfinished Business"
Shrader-Frechette cites and apparently embraces G. E. Moore's indictment
of the "is-ought" fallacy. I intend to focus on the application of Moore's
thought to her argument in favor of eliminating purely scientific decisions
from technology assessments (she views this scientific component as de
cisive, as the one coming from the "experts"). She also sees the problem
of equating scientific "facts" with the "is" in Moore's doctrine. Scientists
assume this equation, and her whole book carefully argues against this
assumption.
I want to take the argument a step further:
I contend
that--when properly understood--the "naturalistic fallacy" can no longer
be viewed as fallacious within the context of technology assessments.
I
will briefly examine how she establishes her posit ion in regard to Moore,
then offer some criticism of her position which, I believe, should defend
the so-cal led "is-ought" fallacy.
After that, I wi II develop my own ar
gument by a further discussion of her position, in Section 1; a discussion
of possible grounds for an environmental ethic in Section 2; in Section
3, I will return to Moore and another possible approach to an environ
mental ethic; in Section 4, I will seek yet anoth e r ground for this en
terprise; in Section 5, I will review all possible grounds for an
environmental ethic examined in the three previous sections; finally, in
Section 6, I will return once again to the "natura listic fallacy" and con
clude.
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Section I - The Argument
The problem Shrader-Frechette wants to lay bare is mainly that of
the alleged superiority (and sufficiency) of the scientific method and
viewpoint, when issues affecting the public interests are under consid 
eration . Scientifically minded technology assessors, she affirms :
hope to avoid the morass of allegedly subjective normative
judgements and to arrive at more objective, scientific ones ... They
hope that their reduction (of ethical to technical factors) will help
achieve closure on the problem at hand. 1
This she deems wrong, yet she does not wish to exclude science
altogether from the process of assessment: she simply wants it to be a
factor, not the only factor taken into consideration. Therefore, she cites
the "naturalistic fallacy", and recognizes that science views itself in the
role of "is". My criticism, as mentioned above, is a two-fold one.
The
most blatant problem arises precisely in this self-viewing by science.
The whole thrust of Shrader-Frechette's argument throughout her volume
is aimed at proving beyond a doubt that "science" (as understood and
applied in the context under consideration) is other than or more than
"just pure facts." She argues convincingly that behind the scientific
approach a host of undefended assumptions, biases and unquestioned
inferences is hidden . If her argument is correct, and I believe it is -
then "science" in this context is not an "is", rather it distorts and re
presents in a fragmented and often misleading way what it purports to
simply man if est and explain. Shrader-Frechette amply proves and ably
argues this view of science throughout her book through a host of ex
amples.
But if the "is" which purports to ground the "ought" and thus give
rise to the so - called "naturalistic fallacy" is not a real "is", that is if it
does not faithfully manifest and unfold the existential reality of the en
tities it discusses, then this "fallacy" is not really committed by the
proponents of "science alone", as the source of all solutions. Does this
mean that, therefore, Shrader-Frechette is wrong and no fallacy is being
committed? Not at all, fallacies, are being committed. The latter, how
ever, are rather grounded in "scientism" or "ethnocentric reasoning" 2
on the part of the scientist or bureaucrat who wou ld defend this position.
The charge of "naturalistic fallacy", on the other hand, is thus an im
proper one; the more thorough and convincing one believes Shrader
Frechette ' s argument to be, the more obviously wrong the charge.
The second objection I want to raise, and the more serious one,
centers on the fallaciousness of the "is-ought" position as such.
When
we are concerned with risk assessment, we need to examine what really
is the case quite seriously . As we will see, environmental considerations
require that we respect the integrity functioning and specific features
of various ecosystems, including all aspects they manifest, human and
non-human. Their existential reality is essential to ground our ethical
reasoning. The question that arises, therefore, is whether it is possible
to avoid altogether the so-called "naturalistic fallacy", and whether it is
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even desirable to do so, when we are discussing risks and possible en
vironmental damage.
One might well ask, before an attempt is made to decide on this
question, what are ethical doctrines usually based on?
Section 11 - A Question of Grounds
Before addressing the specific question of grounding for environ
mental ethics, one should examine ethical grounding in general, at least
in a cursory manner, appropriate for the format of this paper. A brief
overview of current ethical doctrines, might well start with systems based
on utility.
Util ity is the most serious contender as absolute ground,
especially in the context we are examining, and from the standpoint of
economists and others currently involved in technology assessments and
risk/cost/benefit analyses. And what is "utility" based upon? It is based
on what every man is, i.e., desirous of happiness; this represents his
innate drive and natural inclination.
It seems obvious that J . S. Mill
would agree with this statement. On the other hand, the common human
reality of being capable of pleasure in varying degrees and of pain
grounds Bentham 's thought. If man could not feel pleasure and pain or
universally desire happiness, the basis for both approaches to
utilitarianism would no longer make sense.
Once again, what man is,
not in the sense of an exhaustive essential definition, but in that of
absolutely essential universal properties all men possess, grounds both
doctrines.
If one bases an ethical theory on rights (and the interests they
represent) or on compacts and agreements between rational agents or
even on "justice", one is once again upholding a specific understanding
of what man is. Human beings are viewed as intrinsically valuable per
haps, or as such that they are capable of pains and pleasures, so that
it is prudential for each of them to respect these characteristics in oth
ers, in order to have their own equally respected.
To sum up, if one rejects traditional metaphysical definitions of
"what man is," and the ability of such understanding to ground an ethical
system, one is still reduced to start from a specific yet universal
understanding of a human being:
human beings are understood within
these theories as "rational", as "persons", able to feel pain and pleasure,
to be prudent on their own behalf, perhaps respect others, whether for
prudential reason or altruistic ones.
In the present context, we require an ethic that can extend to all
components of ecosystems, human and non-human as well. Now an en
vironmental ethic is notoriously hard to ground.
The choices available
a re not limitless.
I have discussed elsewhere the problems of locating
this ground in regard to the rights of future generations. 3 It is perhaps
possible to extend in some way one of the accepted homocentric ap 
proaches, though I have not been able to succeed in that enterprise so
far. Then there are several ways of grounding a purely environmental
(non specifically human) ethic.
The easiest way perhaps, is to ground
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it upon human rights, as William Blackstone does, for instance . " If we
have a right to a iivable environment, then surely would-be polluters
have duties to ensure that our rights in this respect are protected. Then
there are authors such as Stone and Singer 5 who argue for corresponding
rights based on the interests of non-human live entities, such as trees ,
for the former, animals for the latter. For our purpose, and against the
background of risk-assessments , the most appropriate approach seems
to be one based on the ecosystem as a whole, such as that of Aldo
Leopold . 6
The present format will not permit an in-depth discussion. For our
purpose, the important point to note is that all of these approaches are
to some extent based on an "is", i . e., an existential reality . We are
an imals of the kind that requires a certain type of environment in order
to live and to enjoy a worthwhile life. Or, one might say in a shift of
emphasis, animals are intelligent, sentient beings and, therefore, we must
respect their interests and feelings of satisfaction or pain, without being
limited by prejudice and homocentricity.
It is because of what we or they, or even "all" is that certain
consequences follow, or that certain interests and rights are established,
while in turn demand certain duties. What is then the status of Moore' s
contention on the question of the "naturalistic Fallacy?"
Section 111 - Moore Revisited
One might perhaps agree in general with Moore ' s contention , that
" it is natural" is not equivalent to "it is good," and still turn to Moore
himself for some possible alternative ways to understand his position.
On the question of the subject matter of ethics, Moore acknowledges that
... the grossest errors will be committed in such comparison (i . e.,
the relative values of various goods) if it is assumed that whenever
two things form a whole, the value of that whole is merely the sum
of the values of those two things . 7
Further on, in his discussion of "Naturalistic Ethics", he talks about
the value of "health" . Is "health" good? Moore admits he is "not pre
pared to dispute" that statement.
On the other hand he does not wish
to take "healthy is good" as an obvious statement, needing neither
qualifications nor discussion. One can easily grant him his contention
if one adduces just one example:
"healthy" (i . e . , vital, vigorously
growing) cancer cells are not good . One needs to specify or qualify .
Combining health with existence (as in "conducive to continued exist
ence" . for example) seems to render "health" a good, if it is further
joined with the notion of "Wholeness" . Thus healthy cancerous cells are
no longer "good" as they pertain to a small part only, and are in fact
deleterious to health (of the whole) and not conducive to the continued
existence of the latter .
Existence itself, while it may not be a "perfection" in Kant's sense,
is surely a good, the grounding good for any good whatsoever.
This
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approach is not new, but it is in line with recent studies in environmental
ethics.
For instance, in his paper "Is there an Ecological Ethics?, "
Holmes Rolston 111 argues that
The claim that morality is a derivative of holistic character of the
ecosystem proves more radical, for the ecological perspective pene
trates not only the secondary, but also the primary qualities of the
ethic.
And below he adds,
Construct values though man may, he operates in an environmental
context where he must ground his values in ecosystemic obedience.
This "must" is ecologically descriptive:
certain laws in fact cir
cumscribe him and embrace his value enterprises.•
The approach, Rolston claims, is more than scientific (e.g., other
than
merely scientific--as
understooc:r- for our purpose);
itlS
metaecological instead. It is, to some extent, based on Aldo Leopold and
the key claim of his "land ethic":
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability
and beauty of a biotic community.
It is wrong when it tends
otherwise. 9
It is also in line with the values of "existence" and "health",
holistically understood, as our discussion of Moore indicated, in the
previous section. In this sense, both of these can be seen as extensions
from our own right and duty to perserve our biotic integrity within the
system we are a part of, Rolston describes this enterprise as "the mar
riage and mutual transformation of ecological description and evaluation,"
whereby "an 'ought' is not so much derived from an 'is' as discovered
simultaneously with it." 10 The "ought" is discovered in the perceived
"systemic rightness", a much wider and deeper concept than a mere
scientific assessment of this or that aspect of the ecosystem, especially
when the latter is prepared in the service of a specific project, aim, goal
or interest. I will return to this point in the concluding section of this
paper.
Section IV - "Intelligibility" as Ground
A further possible ground for value in eth ics may be seen in na
ture's "intelligibility". 11 Aside from being naturally organized existing
wholes, ecosystems are governed by universal laws. These laws may not
all be known at this or any other time, but appear to be--in principle-
knowable, that is, such that they can be grasped by reason. They are,
in a word, rational. We have now arrived at a third possible component
of a value for nature. Schmitz argues that the intelligibility nature as
such manifests "ordination to their ground (i.e . , to the things of na
ture) . .. ," which "accounts for their capacity of disclosure, i.e., intel-
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ligibility and truth." 12 This ordination is, therefore, also the basis for
respect:
It is this ordination that provides an imperative within them which
the human intelligence must respect in its e_nquiry: viz. that their
truth is a value in itself before it is a value for us . " 13
This approach has a long and interesting background in the history
of philosophy. Heraclitus was, perhaps, the first to connect the logos,
or rationality of universal laws to intelligibility and value . Moreover,
the ultimate worth of rationality is recognized in various ways by all
proponents of homocentric ethical theories as we ll, at least in its
signification of "active" or "agent" rationality (see Section 11 of this pa 
per).
It should not . be too hard to ascribe a corresponding value to
"passive" rationality as well, that is, to intelligibility . Schmitz argues
that "It is because the human intelligence is attuned to this
transcendental capacity in things-- their intelligibility, their capacity for
be ing taken up into a truth relationship--that our intelligence is enabled
to engage in investigation into the very nature of nature itself." 14 He
concludes that,
It is this common bond with things that is the source of the deepest
values of the human intelligence and of human life itself. 15
Section V - Summing Up Possible Grounds for a Broad Ethical Theory
If the last turn of argument is accepted, then we have isolated three
possible sources of value, all three founded upon what is:
( 1) health
(in its connection with holistic existence); (2) the existence of wholes
(as more valuable than mere parts, or their sum); and (3) intelligibility
as rationality within things or the existence of rational laws. To some
extent one needs to take seriously and respect one or more of these as
pects of natural entities if one is concerned with the environment and in
general, with assessing man - made risks, even when these are possibly
affecting present or future human beings . All three criteria upon which
to establish broad-based environmental ethics are clearly grounded upon
as "is", an existential reality which appears worthwhile, good and worth
preserving and upholding. Even those who would deny the need for an
ethic of environmental concern, and would restrict human reasoning about
morality to present human entities, need to ground their doctrines in some
"essential understanding of human beings, viz. human beings as pursuing
happiness, or as sensitive, and thus capable of pleasure or pain.
It
amined
on one
of the
T . A. 's

is my contention that the sort of multifaceted "is" we have ex
and discussed does not posit a fallacious ground for an "ought, "
hand , and manifests an existential reality much different than that
"science" Shrader- Frechette rightly sees as a faulty ground for
and EIA ' s .
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Section VI - Shrader-Frechette and the "Naturalistic Fallacy" Conclusion
Let us return to the twin problems posited at the outset.
Shrader-Frechette points out that science or "the scientific methodology"
assumes that it is equal to "the facts" or "what is". On the other hand,
she argues vigorously for the bias, ideologizing, politicizing, yielding
to pressure groups that unfortunately appears to be inextricably a part
of "science" as it is currently practiced. She is not alone in th is con
tention, for instance, speaking of the Nuclear industry against which she
has also written eloquently, 16 a recent Canadian article states:
The "number" selected for an environmental standard only appears
to be derived directly from the pure disinterested inquiries of the
laboratory: in fact it usually represents a rough compromise among
vested interests, balancing science, politics and economy on the
knife-edge of potential catastrophe. 17
I totally agree with this line of argument: as assessment of any
technology upon which public policy would be based cannot and must not
be solely a product of the scientific community.
This is so, precisely
because of the very arguments and examples Shrader-Frechette cites.
The problems she discloses and documents a re embedded in the scientific
methodology of cost/benefit analyses.
She identifies the Aggregation
Assumption (discussed in her Chapter 5); the Assumption of partial
Quantification ( Chapter 6), as the main methodological assumptions. The
underpinning for all problems she uncovers are linked to the fallacious
"presupposition that Objectivity is Neutrality, " 18 which in turn justifies
the "retreat from Ethical Analysis," as the purported "neutrality" is
meant to serve the public interest best.
It would be impractical to at
tempt to reproduce her wealth of arguments and cite her copious examples
here, Suffice to cite the two-pronged conclusion which underline the
failure of this "public interest" objection. The first point is that
... it fails because it ignores the fact that refusing to engage in
normative analysis does not serve the public interest, but serves
whatever interests are represented by the constitutive and contex
tual
values
implicitly
built
into
the
TA/EIA
data
and
methodology. 19
The second point is that
... it ignores the reality that public policy is made in a political
environment. 20 Her analysis shows that "there is not public interest
devoid of partisan values" or "abstract facts, devoid of constitutive
or contextual values. " 21
Therefore,
even though Moore, too, identifies "factual" or
"existential" with "scientific", perhaps the political and social realities
of his time might have been better suited to attest to the validity of his
claim. This validity, however, can no longer be claimed, a fortiori as
we have seen, in the light of Shrader-Frechette's exhaustive analysis.
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If science is- - if not inherently biased--surely at least intrinsically
evaluative rather than neutral, then there must be yet another "is",
obscured by those "facts" which science improperly purports to manifest
and represent.
It is this second, underlying "is" that needs to be un
covered, layed bare, discussed and analyzed, freed from the obscuring
elements of the previously discussed scientific "is", which is nothing but
a travesty of existential reality.
Once this new "is" is unmasked, then we will have a real "is" upon
which to base at least to some extent our ecologically sensitive "oughts",
and the charge of fallaciousness levied against this procedure will itself
be understood as fallacious instead. This grounding "is" which Rolston
describes as co-existential with its logically and really ensuing "ought"
is clearly deeper than the "factual-as-scientific is" Schrader-Frechette
analyses. The reason for this is not a necessary aspect of the scientific
enterprise, it is not the result of any scientific "ought". On the con
trary, science as such ought to be "socially responsible" rather than
"socially dependent," as Agazzi, for instance, puts it:
The primary task of science must remain the search for truth (i . e.,
for the partial and never fully confirmed truth that is connected
with its noetic structure). 22
"Truth", in turn, is a wide and serious concept, much better able
to substantiate a possible connection with "good" than the sort of frag
mentary "facts" we were discussing . On the other hand, when we are
dealing with risk-assessment in real issues through Technology Assess
ment and Environmental Impact Assessments based upon cost/benefit an
alyses, we must deal with science within the existing political realities,
not "ideal" science, or science as it ought to be.
In that case, after
stating what science's real role ought to be, we must strive to recover
the realities obscured by the present social environment.
It seems to me that when we do recognize the goal and attempt to
succeed in our quest to uncover and recover this ecologically sound "is",
the so-called "Naturalistic fallacy" will no longer be seen as fallicious,
as I have argued .
Many have remarked about the "ills of contemporary science";
Laszlo, for instance, adds the qualifier that these "concern primarily the
impact of its application to society." He recognizes t hat,
These impacts are generated by false expectations attched to science
by the masses, and by the dominant influence of rich and powerful
states and corporations . 2 3
The inappropriate role of scientists as "high priests" of society, and
of science as the only possible bearers of solid truth is slowly changing,
as questions are raised about both assumptions by an increasingly aware
and conscious public . The first step towards a de-mystification of "sci
entific truth" as an unassailable absolute is a clearer understanding of
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what it represents:
it is always a partial truth about a partial object
from a specific standpoint. Agazzi says it well:
... la verite scientifique: .. . est toujours partielle dans len sens
precis ou elle est toujours relative a un domain d'objet qui ne peut
etre que tres limite, du moment qu ' il correspond necessairement a
un decoupage du reel qui s'opere en adoptant uniquement un certain
point de vue et en etablissant de plus des methodes standardisees
pour faire des constations empiriques a l'interieur de ce meme point
de vue limite. 2 4
In turn, all partial truths of this sort do contribute to our ad
vancement toward knowledge of the real, which is our ultimate object,
not "absolute truth".
Thus the false dichotomy between the alleged
"fuzziness" and "inconclusiveness" of ethical and philosophical reasoning
and the "hard facts" and supposed "truth" of science can be set aside,
as Shrader- Frechette advocates.
The next step then is what Laszlo terms "Science in the post-modern
age . " The contemporary orientation to "physical science, big-science,
and engineering-related science" are not the manifestations of immutable,
essential properties of science as such, nor are the "internal values" of
scientific communities (such criteria as "consistency, calculability, re
solution of experimental puzzles, generality, simplicity" and the like),
the only valid ones. 25 Today both prestige and funds attach to those
fields and those methods. But the current changes in worldviews should
bring them an improvement. Laszlo's excellent article pinpoints this de
sirable and possible change precisely.
If the world is viewed (as it has been, and is still regarded by some)
as a "complex mechanism resolvable to its elementary parts," then it is
logical to look for answers exclusively by a thorough study of these parts
in isolation.
If on the other hand the world is understood to be (an
increasing trend, even within science itself) "more likely an evolving
organism," then it is logical to study the whole , "for only the whole
manifests the structures and processes which have emerged ... . " Rather
than a linear "cause to effect structure," what is sought (and under
stood) is a "network of causes and effects acting together within a
structure that maintains and regenerates itself. " 26
Under the influence of these changes in worldviews, "the preser
vation and enhancement of the ecological, biological, social" and other
environment would emerge as the obvious priority and human beings
would strive to live in relatedness to the environment that sustains them.
On the other hand, the effort to conquer and dominate nature through
the creation of an artificial environment wi II be seen as the false goals
that it is, incompatible with a true understanding of our reality .
Laszlo sees this inevitable change in scientific goal, leading to a
parallel re-assessment of technological applications, with the result that
"inappropriate technologies" (i.e., those incompatible with this "new"
scientific enterprise) would be proscribed by international law. " 2 7
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Should this hopeful scenario truly unfold as Laszlo anticipates, then
Shrader-Frechette's suggestions on technology assessments would be im
plemented as clearly in line with the (new) prevailing ideology. Scientific
research might then once again manifest and uncover an "is" worthy of
grounding rather than obscuring an ecological "ought" which will be both
sane, humane and ethically sound .
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SECTION 111
SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES

I

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PERCEPTION OF RISK
W. Jeffrey Burroughs, Ph . D.
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Department of Psychology
Clemson University

There is no body of literature that speaks to the psychological
evaluation of agricultural pesticides and the risks associated with them.
There is however, a substantial, growing literature associated with the
psychological eva luation of risks generally pres e nt in the social and
physical environment. To illustrate the importance of perception in the
evaluation of risk, an organizing model will first be introduced; then
several areas where psychologists have made contributions to risk as
sessment will be reviewed.
Organizing Model
The view taken in this paper is that the perception of risk is pr i
mary to understanding human response to environmental hazards. The
perception of risk begins with data . Such data might be the result of
technical investigations, reports in the popular media, or direct experi
ence. In all cases the data alone do not represent an assessment of risk.
Rather, we filter, organize, store in memory, and cognitively manipulate
such data in constructing a subjective perception of the risk present in
any situation. The contribution of psychology to r isk assessment centers
around understanding the cognitive processes which serve to transform
incoming data into risk perceptions.
In the following sections we will
consider selected research results to demonstrate the impact of psycho
logical variables as subjective risk perceptions are constructed.
Psychological Factors Influencing the Perception
of Risk Attitudes
Attitudes toward the source of a risk are important filters in the
perception and appraisal of hazards.
As an illustration, consider the
economic importance of the source of risk to indiv iduals. Several studies
have been conducted that manipulated attitudes toward source of a risk
and then demonstrated that differences in risk perception were a function
of those changed attitudes.
When individuals were presented with information about the economic
benefits of a new Air Force base in their town, positive attitudes toward
the base were induced . Individuals holding thes e positive attitudes saw
the risks associated with the proximity of an airport as significantly less
than those who had not received the induction . 1 The experiment has
also been done in reverse; individuals who have more negative attitudes
toward an Air Force base see the dangers assoc iated with the base as
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greater than a neutral control group. When individuals' attitudes are
changed, their perceptions of risk seem to change as well.
An additional illustration of the importance of attitudes comes from
observations of what may be termed standing positive attitudes toward
various situations . A good example is the town of Richland, Washington.
Richland is the site of the oldest U.S . nuclear project, the Hanford
Atomic Works, in operation since 1945 . Residents of Richland live on the
border of a 570-square mile nuclear park that houses 75 percent of the
atomic waste in the United States. Yet these individuals report feeling
very secure and safe. Richland is a single-industry town. The economic
well-being of the individuals who work there is highly tied to the Hanford
project. It seems likely that the evaluation of risks associated with living
in Richland are colored by the economic ties between individuals and their
employer.
Athough many types of attitudes may influence our perception of
risks, it is useful to ask who will have economically influenced positive
attitudes toward pesticides . The economic interests of chemical compa 
nies, farmers, and food marketers all will create positive attitudes, which
in turn will impact on perception of pesticide risks.
Evaluation of Subjective Likelihood
When we assess risk, we are assessing the subjective likelihood of
the occurrence of an .event. As a second example of the way that in
coming information is processed to generate subjective perceptions, we
will consider several strategies that psychologists have identified that
are used to help make such judgments. These strategies are heuristics
or rules of thumb that may lead to distortions in "rational" risk assess
ment .
One such heuristic has been termed representativeness . 2 We
desire certainty and confidence in our judgments that can lead to biases.
The pressure to reduce uncertainty and arrive at decisions may
cause individuals to overestimate the reliability of data from small sam
ples . A small amount of data is thus seen as overly representative of a
certain situation. We may pay attention to the results of a few cases in
our experience and overgeneralize to all cases--often ignoring statistical
evidence. Consider farmers who have used the pesticide Temik for years
without problems.
In evaluating risks associated with this pesticide,
these individuals may overgeneralize from their own experience and not
appreciate the hazards that statistical information indicates is present
with this compound .
A second important heuristic used in making estimates of subjective
likelihood has been termed availability . 3 We generally believe an event
is more likely to occur if we can recall or imagine vivid instances of it .
According to the availability heuristic, we search our memories for spe
cific instances of events when we estimate how likely they are. If it is
easy to retrieve instances, we judge the event as likely--if it is difficult,
we judge the event as less likely . This typically works well, but the
likelihood of highly vivid, rare events tends to be overestimated whereas
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bland, common events tend to be underestimated. Applied to pesticides,
availability could function to cause us either to overestimate or under
estimate the likelihood of hazards.
A vivid event such as last year's
highly publicized watermelon poisonings increases the perception of risk
inordinately. In contrast, mundane day-to-day experience with chemicals
on fruits and vegetables evokes risk perceptions that may be artificially
low because consequences are typically not dramatic or even apparent.
Our perceptions of risk are thus influenced by the way that incoming
information is processed.
Perceived Contro l
A third way that psychological processes may influence the percep
tion of risk is through feelings of control that individuals possess. In
general, the greater the perceptions of control in a risk situation, the
less risk we will perceive. 4 Natural disasters, most types of illnesses,
high technology systems and pesticide use are all examples of situations
not typically under an individual's personal control. As a result of this
lack of control, risk perceptions will increase.
One way of increasing
5
feelings of control is through knowledge.
If individuals understand
principles of operation, personal control feelings are enhanced.
Indi
viduals directly associated with pesticides and therefore knowledgeable
about their uses may perceive the risks associated with these compounds
differently from those who are not. Further, it suggests that one way
of decreasing undue fear of pesticide use is by education and the in
creases in perceived control that such knowledge might provide.
Presentation Format of Information
Finally, the way information is presented to us will influence our
evaluation of risks. As an illustration, pretend one has lung cancer and
must decide between surgery and radiation treatment.
Ten out of 100
individuals die during surgery and 66 of 100 individuals who choose
surgery die within five years.
In contrast, among those who receive
radiation therapy, no one dies du ring treatment , but 78 out of 100 die
within five years. Which does one choose? Now suppose additional in
formation becomes available which indicates that the life expectancy of
surgery survivors is 6.8 years while the life expectancy after radiation
treatment is 4. 7 years. Would one change his or her mind? When McNeil
and her associates' asked a group of radiologists, graduate students,
and patients the same questions, 56 percent initially chose surgery.
After being presented with life expectancy information in years, the
percent choosing surgery rose to 75 percent. The notable fact is that
the information describing number of deaths out of 100 and the informa
tion describing average life expectancy is based on the same data and
are simply alternative presentation formats.
As the increase in the
number of subjects choosing surgery shows, different presentation for
mats lead to different evaluations of risk. It is important to realize that
there are no neutral ways to present information.
Different statistical
presentations will be perceived different ways and will lead to different
risk perceptions. These facts again point to the importance of realizing
that risk perceptions are actively constructed from available information.
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Discussion
Any assessment of risk must be based on some type of data . De 
pending on the training and methodology available to an individual , these
data may take many forms .
A biologist , for example , might consider
mortality rates attributable to carcinogens at var ious dosage levels , but
a sociologist might correlate measures of social structure with indices of
s ocial distress .
Of equal importance , indiv iduals without techn ical
t r aining also evaluate hazards present in their envi ronments . Such as 
sessments may be based on information gained through conversations with
others or through popular media. Finally, policy makers may use a wide
variety of technical and popularly reported data in risk - related decision
mak ing and public policy development.
The data presented in this paper suggest that individuals in all
cases, whether they are technically trained or not, will process risk data
they have into subjective perceptions of the risk in given situations.
Even in cases where "objective" data are present, those results must be
interpreted so that some subjective estimate of the amount of risk in that
situation is constructed . Such objective data may be extremely valuab le ,
but all data must be interpreted to be useful . Whether the goal of ri sk
assessment is scientific decision making, personal evaluation of danger,
or the establishment of public policy, incoming data must be processed
into meaningful evaluations. Analyses of perceptions of risk are therefore
c ri t ical to an overall understanding of risk assessment .
Literature Cited
1

Cederlof, R., E. Hons son, and S. Sorenson. "On the Influence of At 
titudes Toward the Source of Annoyance Reactions to Noise : A Field
Experiment . " Nordisk Hygienesk Tidskrift. 48 (1967): 46- 55.

2

Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman, "Belief in the Law of Small Numbe rs ."
Psychological Bulletin 76 (1971) : 105- 110 .

3

Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman,
Heuristics and Biases." Science.

4

Baum , A . , J . E. Singer and C . S. Baum. " Stress and the Environment ."
Journal of Social Issues. 37 (1981): 4-35 .

5

Johnson, J.E . and H. Levanthal. "Effects of Accurate Expectations and
Behavioral Instructions on Reactions during a Noxious Medical Ex
amination . " Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 27 (1974) :
710 - 718; Langer, E. and Saegert, S .
"Crowding and Cognitive
Control." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology . 35 ( 1977) :
175- 182 .

6

McNeil , B. J . , R . Weichselbaum, and S . G. Pauker .
" Fallacy of the
Five- Year Survival in Lung Cancer . " New England Journal of Medi
cine . 299 (1978): 1397-1401 .

71

"Judgment under Uncertainty :
185 (1974) : 1124-1131.

SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF RISK ASSESSMENT
Brenda J. Vander Mey, Ph . D.
Assistant Professor of Sociology
Dep,artment of Sociology
Clemson University

When asked to make a public presentation on sociological aspects of
environmental risk assessment, my initial response was, "Well, what do
you want me to cover?" One might well assume that my request stemmed
from ignorance.
Actually, the concern was with the broad and encom
passing nature of the task. We sociologists, social scientists who study
human behavior using the group as the basic unit of analysis, focus not
only on social environments but also on the symbiotic relationship between
social and physical environments. As stated by Paul Ehrlich 1 " . • . social
systems all operate in an ecological context and interact with the envi
ronmental setting in which society finds itself" (p. 9).
Thus, a topic
such as environmental risk assessment places a heavy burden on sociol
ogists. We must first ask and then attempt to answer such questions
as:
"Who is at risk? What is at risk? What socio-historical factors
promoted this risk? What prevailing ideologies are correlated with per
ceptions of the physical environment vis-a-vis humanity's use of it? What
group membership, lifestyle, and values variables are correlated with the
use and abuse of and concern for the physical environment? Finally,
should sociologists stay on their own "turf" when addressing environ
mental issues?"
Admittedly, this conference is focusing on the use of pesticides and
environmental risk. Beyond a doubt, however, pesticide use falls under
the purview of the broader and more global umbrella of environmental,
ecological issues. Thus, I will speak to the issues of pesticide use and
the aforementioned questions in this context.
The Ecological Crisis
In this nation and throughout the world, the physical environment
has been used, abused, and exploited such that we now face an ecological
crisis. 2 As early as 1285, London suffered smog problems because of
the heavy · reliance on soft coal for fuel, 3 and certain animals became
extinct in Europe by the seventeenth century as a result of uncontrolled
hunting and trapping. 4
Today, we find research and essays on air pollution - types,
sources, and effects on human life and climate, 5 water pollution, water
quality, use and allocation, 6 soil erosion and so il alteration, 7 energy, 8
deforestation, forest use and effects of pollution on forests, 9 , and the
use and effects of pesticides on the environment, humans, and
animals. 10
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A mere cursory perusal of literature on the state of the physical
environment leads one to conclude that not only is the physical environ
ment at risk but also everything in it -- animals, humans, plants.
Ev
erything has been placed at risk.
The risk being run is that of
rendering the physical environment useless and unsafe; depleting natural
resources; polluting the air, water, and soil; losing arable land; and
poisoning or killing all creatures dependent upon the earth for mere
survival.
From a sociologist's point of view, then, it becomes imperative to
ask what factors or social forces facilitated this ecological crisis and what
factors or forces play a part in "fixing" the crisis . Further, we must
ask ourselves which variables are associated with resistance to environ
mentally sound practices and why. The remainder of this paper is ded
icated to this pursuit.

Socio-Historical Aspects of Environmental Perception
and use in the United States
As Riley E. Dunlap and Kent D. Van Liere have noted, writers
frequently contend that "our nation's ecological problems stem in large
part from the traditional values, attitudes, and beliefs prevalent within
our society." 11 These include a capitalistic orientation toward work and
environment, a religious ideology promoting both capitalism and control
over the environment, and a laissez-faire political orientation endorsing
free enterprise with little regulation from official bodies of government.
Hans Huth's extensive volume on the interface between Americans' per
ceptions of the environment and use of it found that in the course of
three centuries we have moved from viewing our natural resources as
inexhaustible and "there for the taking," to revelling in the beauty of
our land, to, in the Roosevelt era, focusing on conservation. Huth's
book ends after a description of the buildup of cities and highways
through the middle of the twentieth century . At the end of his book,
however, it should be noted that Huth stresses the need for the devel
opment of an "ecological conscience" 12 -- beseeching the American, in
the words of Aldo Leopold, to "change his role as a conqueror to that
of a citizen of the biotic community." 1 3
James McEvoy argues that it is difficult to provide a totally reliable
account of the history of Americans' perceptions and uses of the envi
ronment since much of the available written evidence is prosaic and
anecdotal. 14 However, as indicated in the reference made to Huth's 15
work, attempts have been made to organize that which is available toward
such an end.
Evidence indicates that the early colonists were awed by the natural
abundance omnipresent in the new land . Interspersed with this awe was
fear 16 -- fear of the diverse and seemingly hostile ecosystems and their
elements, and fear of what seemed uncontrollable and control Iing. The
response to this fear and awe was couched in religious precepts
taking dominion over the environment. White 17 argues that "Christianity
. . . not only established a dualism over man and nature but also insisted

73

that it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends. "* 18
Although the Genesis passage states that humans have
the duty to take dominion over animals and to subdue the earth, the
colonists, strongly influenced by Calvin, interpreted the creation story
to mean that unbridled use of the earth was expected.
Their fear of
the wild nature of their new world furthered their dedication to
dominion. 19
William Burch's 20 Daydreams and Nightmares : A Sociological Essay
on the American Environment reveals that this awe over abundance and
the dedication to dominion merged with carelessness among the colonists
regarding the environment for at least five reasons (based on a study
done by J. Boorstin and reported by Burch). These reasons were: little
production for a cash market; the need to waste land since land was in
abundance and labor ,was scarce; experimentation with the unfamiliar
land, causing environmental destruction; ignorance of proper farming
techniques; and random development of a system of farming methods. 21
The frontier era served to advance the stage set by the colonists.
Once again, in the face of untamed wildernesses and abundant land and
fueled by the spirit of individualism, Americans set forth to control the
environment, to literally conquer new lands.
Land and nature were to
be used as people saw fit.
Land ownership was seen as the great
equalizer. Frontier values and perception related to the use of the land,
as indicated by Burch 22 - - based on a Congressional study conducted
during the Dust Bowl era) included:
Man conquers nature; natural resources are inexhaustible; habitual
practices are better; what is good for the individual is good for
everybody (note: confer, Huth, 1957, p. 210); an owner may do
with his property as he likes; expanding markets will continue in
definitely; free competition coordinates industry and agriculture;
property values will increase indefinitely; the factory farm is gen
erally desirable; and, the individual must make his own
adjustments. 2 3
As noted by Lewis Moncreif, people on the frontier usually did not
see natural resources as valuable.
Rather, natural resources were ob
stacles.
Forests were clearcut to allow for farming.
Marshes and sod
were considered useless and "obnoxious." It would not be until 1890,
when the frontier had almost been completely settled, that people began

*As a note, I think it worthy to indicate that , although several au
thors (White, 1971; 2 Barr, 1974; 19 McEvoy, 1972 14 ) stress the im
portance of the creation story in Genesis and t he colonists' Calvinistic
leanings as instrumental in the colonists' exploitation of the envi
ronment, I have as yet to see references to Leviticus 19:9, 19:10,
19:19, and 19:23-25 wherein we find para meters placed on the
breeding of cattle, sowing of seeds, and harvesting of crops.
(Further, for an argument regarding the misinterpretation of the
words "dominion" and "subdue," and, hence, a misinterpretation of
the creation story, see Barr, 1974. 19 )
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to re-think at least one tenet of the frontier era:
were exhaustible . 24

resources, indeed,

During the Roosevelt era, at a time when industrialization, mecha 
nization, and urbanization were becoming facts of and forces in the lives
of · all Americans, a notable concern emerged for conservation .
The
government began to alter its view of natural resource management . The
in itial concern was over forest preservation . 25 Since then , we have seen
the emergence of the National Parks Service, the Soil Conservation So
ciety of America, the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth , the Tennessee
Valley Authority, and the Environmental Protection Agency. In addition,
we have witnessed the passage of environmental protection and environ
mental reform legislation such as the National Environmental Protection
Act of 1969 . All of these things, at least in part, stem from the horrible
realization that not only natural resources are exhaustible, but also that
abuse of our environment carries potentially grave consequences.
McEvoy 26 notes, however, that there has not been a consistent
concern over the environment and that the two world wars created cir
cumstances conducive to deflecting public interest in environmental is
sues . When the environmental movement re - emerged in the late 1960s,
it initially was a youth movement and an
upper-middle-class
movement. 2 7
Moncreif argues that the present state of environmental concern and
the ecological crisis itself are both evidence of "what happens when de 
mocracy , technology, urbanization, capitalistic mission, and antagonism
(or apathy) toward natural environments are blended together. " 28 Ac
cordingly, today we find ours elves concerned with the management of our
ecological crisis . This concern over environmental risk is not universal,
to say the least.
Now I would like to turn attention to the variables,
forces , and factors that contemporary sociologists explore vis - a-vis en
vironmental risk .
Keeping in mind the symbiotic natu r e of human and
soc ial environments , it is hoped that we may begin to appreciate not only
th is symbiosis but also the complexity of environmental risk assessment.

Sociological Aspects of Environmental Risk
The Role of Values and Lifestyles
In the preceding discussion on socio - historical aspects of the per
ception and use of the environment, values (estimations of good and bad ,
right and wrong) are pivotal elements in the symbiotic relat ionship be
tween social and environmental issues . Buttel and Flinn indicate that two
distinct dimensions of rural values -- agrarianism and ruralism - - are
differentially associated with environmental concern . Ru ralism finds its
roots in the nostalgic, perhaps imagined, folk cul tu re of rural dwellers.
Values endorsed include "independence, self-sufficiency , and family
farming . 1129 Agrarianism embodies a utilitarian (i . e ., exploitative, eco 
nomic) orientation toward the natural environment. Ru ralism, urban in
nature, focuses on the environment (rural life) as "a point of equilibrium
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between the wilderness and urban civi Iization. " 3 0 Genteel country life
and the exultation and preservation of nature and natural beauty are
v·a l'ues associated with ruralism.
Buttel and Flinn's research indicates
that rural ism is more strongly associated with environmental concern than
is agrarianism, though membership in the upper-middle class was more
significant than either orientation.
It has been argued that pro-environmentalism was borne of urban
dwellers with anti-urban leanings. 3 1 Perhaps Irv ing Horowitz's statement
is appropriate at this point:
. . . it is my belief that the ecology movement is basically a product
of traditional social sentiments that lurk deeply in the minds of many
Americans -- especially those who still harbor faith in rural - ideals
and troglodytic values. Indeed, it is probable that these rural ideals
a re more firmly and fervently held by those who have never been
on a farm and never encountered an honest- t o-goodness farmer. 32
Lowe and Pin hey, 3 3 acknowledging that socia l science research tends
to support the thesis that rural people show lower levels of support for
environmental protection than do urban dwellers , tested the hypothesis
that this less supportive inclination was in part due to the rural dwellers'
utilitarian orientation toward the environment. There did appear to be
a weak but significant relationship between agricultural occupation and
decreased concern for the environment environment. Moreover, research
by Buttel and Flinn 3 4 reinforces this contention and suggests that per
sons living in densely populated areas feel more environmental problems
and thus are more environmentally concerned.
However, it should be
noted that, although regional differences in environmental concern were
minimal, Lowe, Pinhey, and Grimes 135 analysis of the 1973-1978 General
Social Survey data revealed that rural residents living in areas that had
experienced environmental problems scored highe r on environmental con
cern than did residents in rather trouble-free met ropolitan areas. Thus,
residence alone may not be predictive of environmental concern or tend
ency to support environmental reform measures.
In addition to rural-urban differences, differences by social class
may also have bearing on environmental risk. A study of 548 Wisconsin
residents 18 years of age or older revealed tha t income did not appear
to be a significant factor but that education did. 36 Not only did better
educated people evidence greater awareness of environmental problems
but they also were more supportive of environmental reform.
Similar
results were found in Dunlap and Van Liere's 37 two sample (N=l441;
N=558) study comparing Washington state reside nts (first sample) with
the general public (second-sample). The relationship between education,
environmental concern, and support for environmental reform may be a
function of greater exposure to the issues.
Whatever the reason, the
upper-middle-class
seem
to be the most concerned about the
environment. 38
Differences by political orientation and ownership-nonownership of
land also have bearing on environmental risk research.
As might be
expected, persons more "liber·al" in political orientation are more inclined
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toward a global appreciation of environmental risk and needs for reform
than their more conservative counterparts. 39 More specifically, liberals
and Democrats tend to score higher on environmental concern measures
than do conservatives and Republicans. 40 Welfare-state liberals (those
concerned with the disadvantaged and inequality) and anti-laissez-faire
liberals (who contend that the state should intervene for the collective
good) appear most supportive of environmer:ital reform yet divided among
themselves regarding the government's role . 41
Although it is sometimes fruitless to label people either "liberal" or
"conservative" since these exist on a continuum and can even be issue 
specific, it does appear that the more "pro-business" Republican orien
tation facilitates the resistance to environmental measures threatening to
the corporate elite. 42 Overall, "liberalism" appears related to education,
a variable previously discussed.
John Pierce's 43 study of 687 Washington state residents' values
orientation and support for water resource preservation revealed that,
not surprisingly, property owners were more supportive than non
property owners. The most supportive group was property owners with
waterfront properties .
Thus, all political orientation and social class
variables aside, personal, individual reasons may prompt or deter one's
stance vis-a-vis environmental issues in general or specific environmental
issues of local importance.
Those most in favor of pesticides and their use appear to be farm
ers .
They tend to perceive a real need for pesticides in their
industry. 44
Again, we see the importance of assessing environmental
issues on the basis of one's relationship to the general environment or
to certain environments or environmental practices. That is, one's own
involvement with the environment must be considered. A utilitarian re
lationship with the environment (e.g., the farmers with their pesticides;
the waterfront property owners with their water) significantly shapes
one's assessment of risk and willingness or reluctance to support envi
ronmental reform.

The single most important predictor of percept ion of environmental
risk and support for environmental reform is age . 45 Young people ages
18-25 show the greatest degree of environmental concern and support for
environmental reform. 46 Buttel and Flinn contend that
pro-environmentalism d9vetails with the historically low commitment
of youth to the dominant va Iue system du ring the past decade ... the
strong generational cast to pres ent patterns of environmental beliefs
is due, in part, to the radicalization of youth during the
1960s, .. . along with possible ' sublimation' of this radicalization into
reformist movement issues such as environmentalism . 4 7
Certainly, age and generation are important variables. 48 Further, given
that public support for environmental reform is relatively high, it appears
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that age, although remaining a factor, will soon
groups as cohorts begin to age.
Economics vs. the Environment:

incorporate more age

The Crux of the Matter?

As previously alluded to several times, prevailing ideology and use
of the environment are crucial variables to study in risk assessment.
The colonists and pioneers, influenced by Calvinism, the Protestant
Ethic, and their perception of abundance, have left a legacy with which
to this very day we must contend. Our faith in technology and science
prompted the use and incorporation of agricultural and industrial prac
tices and chemicals, which, in turn, contributed heavily to our current
ecological crisis. Although as a nation we have begun to come to grips
with the crisis, and its ancestors, one force still holds sway. That force
is economics.
Warren A. Johnson and John Hardesty note: ~,, ... our economic
system maximizes output... while our ecology calls for balanced
throughput, for limiting the consumption of resources to conserve the
materials on which the functioning of the ecosystem depends and to avoid
contaminating the ecosystem with an excess of waste. " 4 9
The economic issue is one which must be broached on a national as
well as an individual level. Does "big business" own our air and water?
In whose best interest is it for farmers to use hazardous pesticides to
increase yield and profit? In what ways should land be used? How do
we bridge the gap between the economic and ecological realms? Is eco
nomics the crux of the matter?
Farmers, utilitarian for the most part in their orientation to their
industry, do that which appears to be the most efficient and profitable
-- as do other industrialists. When pesticides (specifically, DDT) were
introduced on a large scale in 1945, they were seen as the answer to
many farmers' problems. With the pest populations controlled or exter
minated completely, larger and more profitable harvests were assured.
In the early 1960s, researchers began warning of the harmful environ
mental effects of pesticides. 5 0 Organic farming has been offered as a
solution. Though viewed as impractical by farmers (especially by those
with large operations), when energy savings are taken into account, at
least one study indicates that profit margins are roughly the same. 51
Integrated Pest Management (1PM) -- crop rotation; use of resistant
plants, use of hormones and pheromones; selective use of pesticides, etc.
-- has been offered as a second alternative.
While I PM holds great
promise, farmers, fearful of economic loss du ring the transition period,
are reluctant to alter their practices. In addition, since the goal of 1PM
is to keep pests at a level just below potential injury to crops, farmers,
influenced by pesticide manufacturers, do not perceive I PM to be a viable
solution or alternative. 52
In their study of 340 Illinois farmers, Pampel and van Es found that
practices profitable to farmers commercially were related to innovation
and adaptation while farmers' environmental adaptations were not. Ac-
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tually, the research indicated that the adoption of commercial innovations
is independent of the adoption of environmental innovation. Farm capital,
acres farmed, fa rm sales and farmers' education were significantly related
to the adaptation of commercial practices . For these same variables, only
farm capital bore a significant relationship to the adaptation of environ
mental practices. 5 3
Buttel and Flinn 54 found a weak relationship between attitudes to
ward economic growth and environmental control . They caution, how
ever, that forced compliance with environmental reform will, in all
likelihood, be unsuccessful.
Even voluntary compliance must be very
gingerly promoted .
Economic orientation, in itself, represents a value orientation. En
vironmental improvement poses itself as a direct threat to economic
expansionists. 5 5
Similar dilemmas are found when one focuses on land-use planning.
Our soil is precious and exhaustible. Current est imates are that 2 billion
tons of soil are deposited into water systems every year.
Some areas
of the Midwest now retain less than six inches of topsoil. And, though
large-scale conservation began in the 1930s, we now find that irrigation
and sewer systems, as well as other development imperatives, are
usurping soil conservation areas and efforts. 56 As the U. S. continues
to urbanize and residential sprawl creeps out into exurbia and rural
areas, about 1 million additional tons of prime farm land are taken over
each year . 57 In this country, land has been used on a best-fit basis.
Until very recently, only an economic value was usually applied to land.
Today, groups are emerging who view land as a natural and precious
resource.
Though speaking only to land use, Gunnar C . lsberg's
statement that certain land use trends in the United States suggest that
we are reaching a profound period in history in which choices related
to land use may have a profound effect upon future generations. Making
these decisions may necessitate that we alter our view of environmentally
sensitive lands from an economic perspective to one that recognizes the
intrinsic value of these lands to society, which is to be held in trust for
existing and future generations, 58 is a statement actually pertaining to
the entire ecological crisis and our necessary responses to it.

Conclusion and Final Note
Conclusion
This paper provides a cursory overview of the nature and extent
of our current ecological crisis.
It is noted that values and prevailing
ideologies, especially the Calvinists' devotion to dominion and the pio
neers' rugged individualism, not only shaped Americans' perceptions of
our relationship to and proper use of the environment but also facilitated
circumstances conducive to our current ecological crisis.
Sociological
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factors investigated in environmental risk research include: the role of
values and lifestyles; rural-urban residence; social class; political ori
entation; and age. Younger, urban, upper-middle-class and politically
liberal people evidence more concern for the environment and more sup
port for environmental reform.
Farmers and those others who have a
utilitarian emphasis tend to evaluate the environment in economic and
use-value terms.
It appears that, if we are to manage our ecological
crisis, a shift in perceptions of the value of our environment is imper
ative.

Final Note
Although this paper is more general in scope rather than being
purely sociological, it was felt that, given the symbiotic relationship be
tween social and natural environments, it should necessarily be so. Paul
R. Ehrlich 59 has argued for a teamwork approach -- a multi-disciplinary
approach -- to environmental issues.
Oscar S. Gray 6 0 , in his keynote
address at the Conference on Application of Behavioral Sciences to En
vironmental Design, bemoaned the fragmentation by academic discipline
when dealing with a topic that essentially has no boundaries. The need,
as so simply yet eloquently stated by Calvin W. Taylor, 61 , is "for the
pertinent professions and sciences to function together, especially to be
of greatest service to the public." Whether speaking to environmental
design for purely aesthetic purposes, or focusing on environmental risk
and reform for survival purposes, we are well advised to forget the "turf"
of our (erroneously) presumed pristine disciplines and work together,
doing our part in the management of our shared ecological crisis.
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